A Lesson from Housing Bubble
Before we replace angst about housing, mortgages and credit markets with anxiety about rising oil prices, consider what we’ ve learned in the past several months. We had a housing bubble; that’ s now obvious. But how did it happen? Why was its bursting so painful? Without answers, we can’ t hope to reduce chances of a repeat.
Boil it down to the three reasons: rocket scientists, regulators, and ratings agencies.
The rocket scientists are the wizards of Wall Street who invented securities that supposedly dispersed risk widely but actually created much more leverage than proved wise.
In a modern capitalist system, regulators provide guardrails to keep markets from driving the economy off a cliff. The regulators failed. Whether regulators should or could have restrained innovation on Wall Street or prohibited business deals between consenting, sophisticated adults is a tough question.
Among their many failings, the regulators allowed lenders to make a fundamental mistake: To lend not against the borrower’ s cash flow and income, but instead to lend against the seemingly inexorable increase in the value of the collateral. Mortgages were made to people who couldn’ t afford the payments because the lender (or investor) figured that if the borrower defaulted, the house would always be worth more than the loan.
Then there are the rating agencies. The flaws of rating agencies are a melange of conflicts of interest, misleading grading systems that classified complex securities as if they were much like simple corporate bonds and a backward-looking approach that proved particularly useless. They were the enablers. They are atoning and changing their ways, as they should. Their business model will change; government oversight will be strengthened.
But investors who relied on the rating agencies are at fault, too. Rating firms became a crutch for investors who simply didn’ t want to spend the time and money required to be prudent investors at a time when low interest rates had everyone reaching for higher returns without contemplating the higher risks.
A little “back to basics” in banking and investing would go a substantial way toward avoiding a repeat of the Panic of 2008.
无房市泡沫的教训
在我们把对房市、抵押贷款和信贷市场的不安情绪转向一路上涨的油价之前,还是先总结一下在过去几个月里都学到了些什么吧。房市出现了泡沫;这一点现在看来已是无庸置疑了。不过,房市泡沫又是如何产生的呢?为什么泡沫破裂让我们如此痛苦不堪?如果没有找到这些问题的答案,我们就不能指望今后不会重蹈覆辙。
产生房市泡沫的根源有三:金融专家、监管机构和评级机构。
金融专家是华尔街的魔法师,他们发明了理应能广泛分散风险的证券,而实际上这些证券却产生了超出合理水平的过多的杠杆。
在一个现代的资本主义体系中,监管机构会提供防护使市场不至把经济推向悬崖。但美国监管机构没有做到这一点。它们是否应该或是可以控制华尔街上的创新、或是禁止符合法定要求的心智成熟的成年人之间进行商业交易,这是个很难回答的问题。
监管机构有很多失职之处,其中一个就是放任放贷机构犯了一个初级错误:不是根据贷款人的现金流和收入情况决定可以放贷,而是根据看似价值在暴涨的抵押品。抵押贷款贷给了无力还款的人,因为放贷机构(或是投资者)以为,如果贷款人违约了,房屋将总是比贷款更值钱。
然后就是评级机构。评级机构的缺陷是一系列问题综合作用的结果,其中包括利益冲突、易让人误解的把复杂证券视同简单公司债务进行评级的评级系统以及尤其毫无用处的追溯法。它们成了房市泡沫的推手。而现在它们正在进行弥补,改变方法,正如他们应该做的那样。评级机构的业务模式将发生改变;政府的监管将得到加强。
不过,依靠评级机构的投资者也有责任。低利率促使所有的人都追求更高的回报,而不考虑相伴而来的高风险,在这种时候,投资者需要花时间、花金钱进行谨慎投资,而对于那些不想付出的投资者来说,评级公司就成了他们的拐杖。
回到银行业和投资的基本问题上,这将能在很大程度上避免2008年的房市恐慌在今后的岁月重演。