单选题 The single most shattering statistic about life in America in the late 1990s was that tobacco killed more people than the combined total of those who died from AIDS, car accidents, alcohol, murder, suicide, illegal drugs and fire. The deaths of more than 400,000 Americans each year, 160,000 of them from lung cancer, make a strong case for the prohibition of tobacco, and particularly of cigarettes. The case, backed by Solid evidence, has been made in every public arena since the early 1950s, when the first convincing link between smoking and cancer was established in clinical and epidemiological studies-yet 50m Americans still go on smoking.
Allan Brand, a Harvard professor, has written a history of the cigarette in America. It runs from the automatic rolling machine, patented by lames Bonsack in 1881, to last year's retreat by the Bush administration in a case that was intended to make the industry meet the full cost to the federal government of treating tobacco-related illness. It is a remarkable story; clearly told, astonishingly well documented and with a transparent moral motif.
Most smokers in America eventually manage to quit, and local laws banning smoking in public have become common, but the industry prospers. The tobacco companies have survived virtually everything their opponents have thrown at them. At the end of his story, Mr. Brandt writes, "The legal assault on Big Tobacco had been all but repelled. The industry was decidedly intact, ready to do business profitably at home and abroad. " Although the conclusion is not to his liking, Mr. Brandt's is the first full and convincing explanation of how they pulled it off.
Cigarettes overcame any lingering opposition to the pleasure they gave when American soldiers came to crave them during the First World War. War, says Mr. Brandt, was "a critical watershed in establishing the cigarette as a dominant product in modern consumer culture". Cigarettes were sexy, and the companies poured money into advertising. By 1950 Americans smoked 350 billion cigarettes a year and the industry accounted for 3.5% of consumer spending on non-durables. The first 50 years of the "cigarette century" were a golden era for Big Tobacco.
That was simply because, until the 1940s, not enough men had been smoking for long enough to develop fatal cancers (women did not reach this threshold until the 1970s). The first clinical and epidemiological studies linking cigarette-smoking and lung cancer, were published only in 1950. By 1953 the six leading companies had agreed that a collective response was required. They paid handsomely for a public-relations campaign that insistently denied any proof of a causal connection between smoking and cancer. This worked well until 1964, when a devastating report from the surgeon-general's advisory committee in effect ended medical uncertainty about the harmfulness of smoking.
But Big Tobacco rode the punches. When the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ruled that health warnings must appear on each pack, the industry consented. But it shrewdly exploited the warning, "in a culture that emphasized individual responsibility, smokers would bear the blame for willful risk-taking," notes Mr. Brandt. Many cases for damages against the companies foundered on that rock. Cigarette-makers also marshaled their numerous allies in Congress to help the passage of a law that bypassed federal agencies such as the FTC, and made Congress itself solely responsible for tobacco regulation. Describing the pervasive influence of tobacco lobbyists, he says, "legislation from Congress testified to the masterful preparation and strategic command of the tobacco industry. "
However, the industry was powerless to prevent a flood of damaging internal documents, leaked by insiders. The companies were shown, for instance, to have cynically disregarded evidence from their in-house researchers about the addictive properties of nicotine. Internal papers also showed that extra nicotine was added to cigarettes to guarantee smokers sufficient "satisfaction".
Despite such public-relations disasters, the industry continued to win judgments, most significantly when the Supreme Court rejected by five votes to four a potentially calamitous act that would have given the Federal Drug Administration the power to regulate tobacco products. The industry's shrewdest move was to defuse a barrage of cases brought by individual states, aiming to reclaim the cost of treating sick smokers. The states in 1998 accepted a settlement of $ 246 billion over 25 years (the price of a pack rose by 45 cents shortly, afterwards). In return, the states agreed to end all claims against the companies. But the settlement tied the state governments to tobacco's purse- strings; they now had an interest in the industry's success.
For those who thought the settlement was akin to "dancing with the devil", it appeared in retrospect that the devil had indeed had the best tunes, reports Mr. Brandt. To his credit, he manages to keep his historian's hat squarely on his head. But you can feel the anguish.

单选题 It can be inferred from the first two paragraphs that ______.

单选题 To protect the industry, the tobacco companies did all the following EXCEPT ______.

单选题 The phrase "rode the punches" in Line 1 of Paragraph 6 can be interpreted as ______.

单选题 According to the author, Allan Brandt’s attitude towards the cigarette reflected in his book is one of ______.

单选题 Which of the following might be the most appropriate title for the text?