单选题 For eight years the Clinton Administration preached the need for exquisite sensitivity to the Russians. They'd had a rough time. They needed nurturing from their new American friends.
They got it. We fed them loans, knowing that much of the money would disappear corruptly. We turned away from atrocity in Chechnya lest we weaken the new Russian state. But most important, we went weak in the knees on missile defense. The prospect of American antiballistic missiles upset the Russians. And upsetting the Russians was something we simply were not to do.
The Russians cannot keep up with American technology. And they fear that an American missile shield will render obsolete their last remnant of greatness: their monster, nuclear-tipped missiles. So they insist that we adhere to a 1972 treaty signed with the defunct Soviet Union that prohibited either side from developing missile defenses. That the treaty is obsolete-it long predates the world of rogue states racing to acquire missile-launched weapons of mass destruction-does not concern the Russians. Withdraw from the treaty, they said, and you have destroyed the "strategic stability" on which the peace of the world depends.
The Clinton Administration took that threat seriously-so seriously that for eight years it equivocated on building an American ABM system. Finally, President Clinton promised to decide by June 2000. Come June, he punted.
Eight years, and no defense. But the bear was content.
Bear contentment was never a high priority for Ronald Reagan. He offered a different model for dealing with the Russians. The 1980s model went by the name of peace through strength. But it was more than that. It was judicious but unapologetic unilateralism. It was willingness-in the face of threats and bluster from foreign adversaries and nervous apprehension from domestic critics-to do what the U.S. needed to do for its own security. Regardless.
It was Reagan who famously proposed a missile shield, and even more famously refused to barter it away at the Reykjavik summit, an event many historians consider the turning point in the cold war. That marked the beginning of the Soviets' definitive realization that they were going to lose the arms race to the U.S.-and that neither threats nor cajoling would dissuade the U.S. from running it.
This decade starts with a return to the unabashed unilateralism of the 1980s. It began last year with a speech by George W. Bush proposing that the U.S. build weapons to meet American needs-and not to accommodate the complaints or gain the agreement of other countries. For 40 years the U.S. would not cut its offensive nuclear missiles except in conjunction with Soviet cuts. Bush's refreshing question was: Why? We don't need Rnssians cutting our offensive weapons through arms-control treaties. And we don't need Russians telling us whether or not to build defensive weapons.
This was the genesis of the Bush Doctrine, now taking shape as the Administration takes power. Its motto is, we build to suit-ourselves. Accordingly, the President and the Secretary of Defense have been unequivocal about their determination to go ahead with a missile defense.
They staked their claim. And what happened? Did the sky fall, as the Clinton Russian experts warned? On the contrary. Convinced at last of American seriousness, the Russians immediately acquiesced. After just one month of Bush, Moscow has come forward with its very own missile-defense plan. The fact that it is not well sketched out and that it is in part designed to split the U.S. off from Europe is beside the point. The Russians have responded, as did the Soviets before them, to American firmness. Faced with reality, they accommodate it.
Who defines reality; there lies the difference between this Administration and the last. Clinton let Russian opposition define reality. Bush, like Reagan, understands that the U.S. can reshape, indeed remake, reality on its own.
In the liberal internationalist view of the world, the U.S. is merely one among many-a stronger country, yes, but one that has to adapt itself to the will and the needs of "the international community." That is why the Clinton Administration was almost manic in pursuit of multilateral treaties-on chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear testing, proliferation. No matter that they could not be enforced. Our very signing would show us to be a good international citizen.
This is folly. America is not mere international citizen. It is the dominant power in the world, more dominant than any since Rome. Accordingly America is in a position to reshape norms, alter expectations and create new realities. How? By unapologetic and implacable demonstrations of will.

单选题 in the second paragraph, the author believes that ______.
A. the Russians understood that they needed nurturing from their new American friends
B. the Russians knew Americans will surely help them
C. upsetting the Russians was something the Americans simply were not to do
D. the Americans shouldn't worry about upsetting the Russians

单选题 ______ does not concern the Russians.
A. The US withdrawal from the treaty
B. That the treaty is obsolete
C. That several rogue states race to acquire missile-launched WMD
D. That the Russians cannot keep up with American technology

单选题 It can be inferred that the policy Clinton Administration pursued went by the name of
A. peace through strength B. strength through peace
C. unapologetic unilateralism D. apologetic unilateralism

单选题 What does the author conclude from Russia's response (Moscow has come forward with its very own missile-defense plan.)?
A. They staked their claim.
B. Russia is afraid of the United States.
C. Russia will continue its opposition to the United States' withdrawal from the ABM treaty.
D. Russia will adapt to the reality reshaped by the United States.

单选题 The content of the passage can be described as______.
A. narrative B. argumentative C. descriptive D. expository