单选题 Yasuhisa Shizoki, a 51-year old MP from Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), starts tapping his finger on the dismal economic chart on his coffee table. "Unless we change the decision-making process," he says bluntly, "we are not going to be able to solve this kind of problem." With the economy in such a mess, it may seem a bit of a diversion to be trying to sort out Japan's political structures as well as its economic problems.
Since co-writing a report on political reform, which was released by an LDP panel last week, Mr Shiozaki has further upset the party's old guard. Its legionaries, flanked by columns of the bureaucracy, continue to hamper most attempts to overhaul the economy. Junichiro Koizumi was supposed to change all that, by going over their heads and appealing directly to the public. Yet nearly a year after becoming prime minister, Mr Koizumi has precious little to show for his efforts. His popularity is now flagging and his determination is increasingly in doubt.
As hopes of immediate economic reform fade, optimists are focusing on another potential benefit of Mr Koizumi's tenure. They hope that his highly personalized style of leadership will pave the way for a permanent change in Japanese politics: towards more united and authoritative cabinets that are held directly accountable for their policies. As that hap pens, the thinking goes, real economic reforms will be able to follow. Unfortunately, damage limitation in the face of scandal too often substitutes for real reform. More often, the scandals serve merely as distractions. What is really needed is an overhaul of the rules themselves.
A leading candidate for change is the 40-year-old system--informal but religiously followed--through which the LDP machinery vets every bill before it ever gets to parliament. Most legislation starts in the LDP’s party committees, which mirror the parliamentary committee structure. Proposals then go through two higher LDP bodies, which hammer out political deals to smooth their passage. Only then does the prime minister's cabinet get fully involved in approving the policy. Most issues have been decided by the LDP mandarins long before they reach this point, let alone the floor of parliament, leaving even the prime minister limited influence, and allowing precious little room for public debate and even less for accountability.
As a result, progress will probably remain slow. Since they know that political reform leads to economic reform, and hence poses a threat to their interests, most of the LDP will resist any real changes. But at least a handful of insiders have now bought into one of Mr Koizumi's best slogans: "Change the LDP, change Japan./

单选题 The diversion Yasuhisa Shizoki enjoys is mentioned in the text to
A. to introduce the topic of economic reforms.
B. to honor his unique service to the LDP.
C. to highlight his ability to solve problems.
D. to show how he sort out his slogans.

单选题 The expression "the LDP mandarins" (Paragraph 4) most probably means
A. cabinets who are held liable for their policies.
B. those who work in LDP's party committees.
C. candidates for two higher LDP bodies.
D. those who are strong in favor of reforms.

单选题 The basic problem of Japanese economy as pointed out by the writer lies in
A. its prime minister's negligence.
B. the inefficiency of its parliament.
C. its defective political structures.
D. the resistance to any changes.

单选题 In the eyes of the author, an economic reform in Japan
A. should precede a political reform.
B. cannot do without Koizumi's popularity.
C. should follow an overhaul of the rules.
D. is a now boom on the horizon.

单选题 It seems that the write is very critical of
A. LPD bodies' accountability.
B. the prime minister.
C. advocates of economic reforms.
D. the LDP machinery.