Economists have long tried to explain this sudden surge in output.Most theories have focused on the factors driving long-term economic growth such as the quantity and productivity of labor and capital.But a new paper takes a different tack (思路):faster growth is not due to bigger booms,but to less shrinking in recessions.Stephen Broadberry of Oxford University and John Wallis of the University of Maryland have taken data for 18 countries in Europe and the New World,some from as far back as the 13th century.
To their surprise,they found that growth during years of economic expansion has fallen in the recent era-from 3.88% between 1820 and 1870 to 3.06% since 1950—even though average growth across all years in those two periods increased from 1.4% to 2.55% . Instead,shorter and shallower slumps led to rising long-term growth.Output fell in a third of years between 1820 and 1870 but in only 12% of those since 1950.The rate of decline per recession year has fallen too,from 3% to 1.2% .
So why have these "growth reversals" decreased in length and depth? In another paper Broadberry and Wallis find that conventional explanations—such as demographic change or a sectoral shift from volatile (不稳定的) agriculture to the more stable services sector—do not fully explain the shift. More important is the rise of the rule of law,enabling disputes to be settled by impartial courts.
Before the modern era,elites would fight between themselves for the spoils of growth and send the economy back to square one through wars,corruption and the like.Respect for courts to resolve disputes prevents this from happening.With populist (民粹主义的) politicians challenging the authority of judges once again across the world,that is food for thought.
What is the author's suggestion for protecting the economy from being damaged by elites?无全文翻译
科幻小说家罗伯特·海因莱因写道:“纵观历史,贫穷是人类的常态。”直至18世纪,全球人均国内生产总值仍停留在725美元到1,100美元之间,该收入水平大约相当于世界银行目前的贫困线:每天1.90美元。但自此以后,全球人均收入水平加速增长,从1800年的1,100美元左右到1950年的3,600美元,现在已经超过10,000美元。 长久以来,经济学家一直试图解释这一产出激增的原因。大多数理论都聚焦在推动长期经济增长的因素上,如劳动力数量和生产率以及资本。
但一篇新论文采用了不同的思路:增长加速并非由于繁荣期的更大发展,而是由于衰退期的收缩程度减弱。牛津大学的斯蒂芬·布劳德伯利和马里兰大学的约翰·沃利斯收集了欧洲和美洲18个国家的数据,其中有些数据可追溯至13世纪。令他们吃惊的是,他们发现经济扩张期的增长率在近期反而是下降的——从1820年至1870年间的3.88%下降到1950年至今的3.06%—尽管这两个时期中所有年份的平均增长率从1.4%上升到了2.55%。
相反,时间较短和程度较浅的衰退导致了长期增长率的上升。在1820年至1870年间,三分之一的年份出现了产出下降,但自1950年以来,只有12%的年份出现产出下降。每个经济衰退年的下降率也从3%降至1.2%。
那么,这些“增长逆转”为何在长度和深度方面有所下降?在另一篇论文中,布劳德伯利和沃利斯发现:传统的解释——比如人口统计数据的变化或者行业从不稳定的农业转向更稳定的服务业——并不能完全解释这一变化。
更为重要的是法治的兴起,使纠纷可以通过公正的法庭得以解决。
在现代社会之前,精英们会相互争夺经济增长带来的利益:并通过战争、盒腐等方式将经济打回原形。蔓重法庭来解决争端可以阻止该情况的发生。随着世界各地民粹主义政客再次挑战法官的权威,这不禁引人深思。