Finally, what about the world? Is it something like an object, or something like a process, or something like a fact? Well, what can we say of the world? Surely it is large and wide. We are in it and some things in it are closer to us than others; we speak of this part of the world. True, the world cannot move and is not somewhere, but this should not disturb us in view of the relativity of these concepts. It seems, then, that the world is very much like an object; more exactly, the idea of the world is the limiting idea of the totality of all objects. Objects are parts of the world, somewhat as organs are parts of an organism. Then, surely, objects are in the world in a very straightforward sense.

Yet the coin has another side. It is possible to speak of the beginning or the end of the world. We even say that in spite of John's death the world goes on as before. If, therefore, the world is also a process, then other processes may be in it as parts: much the same way as the writing of this chapter is a part of my life. But even this process aspect of the world aside, all processes, actions, and events take place in the world in the indirect sense I mentioned above.

But how can facts possibly be in the world? When they cannot even be in more familiar receptacles like rooms or continents?

This brings us back to the correspondence theory, Austin's demonstrative and descriptive conventions, and the maxim, “A statement is true if it fits the facts.” If the correspondence theory requires a relation between empirical statements and observable entities in the world, then facts are not qualified for this latter role. Objects and processes might be, but then I do not know how to formulate the theory.