单选题 Here is a quick way to spoil a Brussels dinner party. Simply suggest that world governance is slipping away from the G20, G7, G8 or other bodies in which Europeans may hog up to half the seats. Then propose, with gloomy relish, that the future belongs to the G2: newly fashionable jargon for a putative body formed by China and America.
The fear of irrelevance haunts Euro-types, for all their public boasting about Europe’s future might. The thought that the European Union might not greatly interest China is especially painful. After all, the 21st century was meant to be different. Indeed, to earlier leaders like France’s Jacques Chirac, a rising China was welcome as another challenge to American hegemony, ushering in a “multipolar world” in which the EU would play a big role. If that meant kow-towing to Chinese demands to shun Taiwan, snub the Dalai Lama or tone down criticism of human-rights abuses, so be it. Most EU countries focused on commercial diplomacy with China, to ensure that their leaders’ visits could end with flashing cameras and the signing of juicy contracts.
Meanwhile, Europe’s trade deficit with China hit nearly∈170 billion ( $ 250 billion) last year. In five years, China wants 60% of car parts in new Chinese vehicles to be locally made. This is alarming news for Germany, the leading European exporter to China thanks to car parts, machine tools and other widgets.
As ever, Europeans disagree over how to respond. Some are willing to challenge China politically — for example, Germany, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands. But they are mostly free traders. That makes them hostile when other countries call for protection against alleged Chinese cheating. In contrast, a block of mostly southern and central Europeans, dubbed “accommodating mercantilists” by the ECFR (The European Council on Foreign Relations), are quick to call for anti-dumping measures: But that makes them anxious to keep broader relations sweet by bowing to China on political issues.
The result is that European politicians often find themselves defending unconditional engagement with China. The usual claim is that this will slowly transform the country into a freer, more responsible stakeholder in the world. The secret, it is murmured, is to let Europe weave China into an entangling web of agreements and sectoral dialogues. In 2007 no fewer than 450 European delegations visited China. Big countries like France and Britain add their own bilateral dialogues, not trusting the EU to protect their interests or do the job properly. There are now six parallel EU and national “dialogues” with China on climate change, for example.

单选题 What is European “fear of irrelevance”?
[A] Europeans may not play big role in the future.
[B] The USA may not be interested in Europe.
[C] China is developing too fast to control.
[D] The EU may not include all European countries.

【正确答案】 A

【答案解析】[设题点] 段首处
[解析] 语义理解题。fear of irrelevance出现在文章第二段首句，要结合第一段的内容才能准确理解此短语的意思。首段提到在布鲁塞尔迅速破坏一场晚宴的方法是指出世界统治权正在从G20、G7、G8或其他欧洲人占半数席位的组织中溜走，未来将属于G2。由此可以看出，欧洲人担心遭冷落，担心世界统治权与自己毫不相干，担心在将来不能扮演重要角色，答案为 [A]。知道irrelevance的意思是“不相关”有助于解题。

单选题 European countries once welcomed China’s growing up because
[A] they needed China to lead them against America.
[B] a rising China contributes to a bipolar world.
[C] China had made great achievements in human rights.
[D] they needed to make money in China’s big market.

【正确答案】 D

【答案解析】[设题点] 因果关系处
[解析] 事实细节题。第二段第四句话提到，崛起的中国受到欢迎是因为它被看作美国霸权的又一个挑战者，迎来了一个“多极世界”，因此[B]错误；[A]“他们需要中国带领他们反对美国”错误，中国的崛起有助于打破美国霸权、建立多极世界，欧盟国家的真正意图是期望能在多极世界里发挥重要作用，并不是期望在中国的领导下反对美国；文中未提到中国在人权方面取得的进步，[C]错误；由此答案为[D]，可在第二段尾句找到依据。