Price controls
Governments have been trying to set maximum or minimum prices since ancient times. The appeal of price controls is understandable. Even though they fail to protect many consumers and hurt others, controls hold out the promise of protecting groups that are particularly hard-pressed to meet price increases. Thus, the prohibition against usury-charging high interest on loans—was intended to protect someone forced to borrow out of desperation; the maximum price for bread was supposed to protect the poor, who depended on bread to survive; and rent controls were supposed to protect those who were renting when the demand for apartments exceeded the supply, and landlords were preparing to “gouge” their tenants.
Despite the frequent use of price controls, however, and despite their appeal, economists are generally opposed to them, except perhaps for very brief periods during emergencies. The reason most economists are skeptical about price controls is that they distort the allocation of resources. Price ceilings, which prevent prices from exceeding a certain maximum, cause shortages. Price floors, which prohibit prices below a certain minimum, cause surpluses, at least for a time. Because controls prevent the price system from rationing the available supply, some other mechanism must take its place. A queue, once a familiar sight in the controlled economies of Eastern Europe, is one possibility.
With all of the problems generated by controls, we can well ask why they are ever imposed and why they are sometimes maintained for so long. The answer, in part, is that the public does not always see the links between controls and the problems they create. General price controls—controls on prices of many goods—are often imposed when the public becomes alarmed that inflation is out of control. However, most inflation, even in wartime, is due to inflationary monetary and fiscal policies rather than to panic buying. Inflation is extremely difficult to contain through general controls, in part because the attempt to limit control to a manageable sector of the economy is usually hopeless. By examining cases in which controls have prevented the price mechanism from working,we gain a better appreciation of its usual elegance and efficiency. This does not mean that there are no circumstances in which temporary controls may be effective. But a fair reading of economic history shows just how rare those circumstances are.
无价格管制
一直以来政府就试图设定最高价或者最低价。价格管制的吸引力是可以理解的。即使价格管制未能保护大部分消费者,并且伤害了其他人的利益,但是它依然坚守要保护那些被物价上涨压迫得喘不过气来的群体的承诺。如此一来,禁止高利贷旨在保护那些处于绝望中被迫借贷的人;对面包的最高限价旨在保护那些靠面包生存的穷人;而对租金的管制则旨在保护那些在住房需求超过供给、房东准备“欺诈”房客时租房住的人。
然而,尽管价格管制手段经常被使用,尽管价格管制吸引力(巨大),除了在一些非常短暂的紧急时期,经济学家一般是反对价格管制的。大多数经济学家不相信价格管制的原因在于它扭曲了资源配置。价格上限,即价格不可逾越的某一最大值,会引起短缺;价格下限,即价格不能低于某一最小值,至少在一段时间里会导致过剩。因为价格管制使价格系统不能对现有供给资源进行合理配置,某些其他的机制就必将取而代之。在东欧管制经济体制下,一度令人熟悉的排队抢购就是价格控制常见的结果。
既然由价格管制引起的问题如此之多,我们就可以有理由问:为什么人们一直在实施价格管制?为什么有时候实施价格管制的时间是如此之长?部分原因是公众并非总能够看到价格管制与由此引发的问题之间的联系。一般价格管制,即对很多商品的价格管制,是在物价失控引起公众惊恐时实施的。但是即使是在战时,大多数通货膨胀也是因为宽松的货币政策和财政政策而非恐慌性抢购引起的。通过一般价格管制来抑制价格是极其困难的,部分原因是将限价对经济体的影响限制在一个可管理的水平上的尝试通常是徒劳的。纵观那些物价管制阻止价格机制发生作用的案例,我们会对价格机制惯常的优雅和有效性有更深的了解。这并不意味着在任何情况下临时的价格管制都是无效的。只是通过对经济历史一个公平的回顾,我们会发现,这种情况是如此的罕见。