单选题 VI. (Jurisprudence) Greenberg pronounces my use of the phrase “theory of adjudication” “unusual,” and I am afraid I can only return the compliment, with one qualification: “theory of adjudication” has no standard usage at all, so writing as though there is a usual meaning is, itself, “unusual.” I was quite clear, as Greenberg’s discussion reveals, about what I meant by it, and so the real question is whether anyone is committed to a Foundationalist Story about the theory of adjudication. Greenberg, however, makes the surprising claim that no one is so committed. Recognizing that Dworkin is one possible target of the Realist critique as I reconstruct it, Greenberg claims that “the right-answer thesis is not central to Dworkin’s project.” The right-answer thesis—the idea that every case has a right answer as a matter of law—would be an example of a Foundationalist Story about adjudication, and so the Realist critique would then have a potent, living target. When Greenberg claims the Foundationalist aspect of Dworkin’s theory isn’t central, he is not making a claim about the amount of effort Dworkin devotes to defending the right-answer thesis, which is obviously substantial. Greenberg’s real claim is that the Dworkin of Law’s Empire is not necessarily committed to the right-answer thesis. I rather agree with Greenberg that Dworkin “is most concerned to establish…that law depends in a particular way on morality” and that “the right-answer thesis…is a downstream consequence of his overall theory of law in conjunction with his view about morality”. So far, this is just a complicated admission that Dworkin accepts a Foundationalist Story about adjudication; the best Greenberg can do is to assert “that most of Dworkin’s arguments could succeed consistent with the falsity of the right-answer thesis.” Greenberg does not show that this is Dworkin’s view, and it is certainly not Dworkin’s view in his early work, since the “retroactivity” objection to legal positivism turns, quite clearly, on the truth of the right-answer thesis. Greenberg may be correct that one could have a view about the nature of morality different than Dworkin’s and give up the right-answer thesis: John Mackie would be a case in point, though not the one Greenberg has in mind, and not one Dworkin would be happy with. But none of this changes the fact that the actual Ronald Dworkin holds a theory of adjudication involving the Foundationalist Story because he holds a particular view about law and morality.

单选题 Greenberg pronounces the use of the phrase “theory of adjudication” “unusual”. The author rebut the comment ( )

单选题 The essence of the right-answer thesis is that ( )

单选题 From the underlined sentence, one can know that ( )

单选题 Reading the whole paragraph, which of the following statements is wrong? ( )