To understand why the current process for training teachers is so broken, let’s use a business example. Imagine two companies. Company A hires the best people it can. Those who are hired are paid and promoted based on performance. This is not easy, as it’s often hard to determine who is really doing a good job. The compensation and promotion process is prone to politics and personal preferences.
Still, most people at Company A recognize that there is a connection between pay and productivity. The true superstars get recognized eventually. Those who come to work but never contribute are fired eventually.
Company B also seeks to hire the best people it can. First, all prospective employees must undertake two years of full-time specialized training, at their own expense, just to be considered for a job. Study after study has shown that this training has zero connection to subsequent performance at the firm, but Company B sticks to this screening mechanism anyway.
Second, all employees eventually hired by Company B are paid based on their years of experience at the firm. Finally, Company B promises that no one who has worked at the company for three years or more will ever be fired, even if their performance is mediocre or poor.
In Company B, employees who come to work and don’t actually work may get fired. The superstars get nothing extra. They aren’t paid more or promoted faster, since pay is strictly tied to years on the job.
As you may have guessed, Company B is public education. Company A is the rest of the economy. That’s not news. Much has been written about the broken incentives within education. But this discussion almost always focuses on how compensation practices affect the incentives of existing teachers.
That makes sense—but it also misses a crucial point. The worst aspect of the public education pay structure is that it discourages motivated, productive, energetic people from entering the profession in the first place.
What’s more, despite a steady flow of evidence that our current teacher training requirements have essentially no correlation with performance in the classroom, most states continue to insist that prospective teachers undertake expensive and time-consuming courses. That, too, is a huge deterrent for bright young people who might otherwise be attracted to teaching.
Which of the following is TRUE about Company A?
定位第一段，由“Those who are hired are paid and promoted based on performance.”可知，A公司是根据职 工的表现来决定升职加薪还有去留问题的。
Employees of Company B will ________.
定位第四段，由“all employees eventually hired by Company B are paid based on their years of experience at the firm”可知，B公司职员们是根据工作时间和经验来决定薪水高低的。B项是没有成为正式职员之前要接 受的自费培训，“prospective employees”而非“employees”。
What does the “this screening mechanism” (Para. 3) refer to?
第三段主要讨论了B公司的职员备选人要自费接受一定的培训，尽管无数的研究结果表明这个培训和 日后的工作表现之间没有持续的关系，但B公司仍然坚持这个机制。
What does the author think about the current process for training teachers?
最后一段讨论了目前教师培训的弊端，在成为教师之前，每个人还需要上很多又贵又消耗时间的课 程，这使得本来愿意当老师的年轻人望而却步，也不愿意从事教师这个职业了。B项容易混淆，参考倒数 第二段，是公立学校的薪酬支付方式无法吸引有创意有才干的年轻人，而不是没有提供足够的机会。
The word “deterrent” (Para. 8) most probably means ________.
deterrent制止物；威慑力量；威慑物。discouragement阻拦；使人泄气的事物，此处指教师培训的又 贵又耗时的课程对年轻人来说是一个很大的阻碍，让他们望而却步。threat威胁，恐吓，用在此处不恰当。