单选题Many in the Middle East have difficulty in adjusting themselves to the new situation created by the departure of the imperial powers. For the first time in almost 200 years, the rulers and people of the Middle East have to accept the final responsibility for their own affairs, to make their own mistakes and to accept the consequences. This is difficult to internalize, even to perceive, after so long a period. For the entire lifetimes of those who formulate and conduct policy at the present time and of their predecessors for many generations, vital decisions were made elsewhere, ultimate control lay elsewhere, and the principal task of statesmanship and diplomacy was as far as possible to avoid or reduce the dangers of this situation and to exploit such opportunities as it might from time to time offer. It is very difficult to forsake the habits not just of a lifetime but of a whole era of history. The difficulty is much greater when alien cultural, social and economic preeminence continues and even increases, despite the ending of alien political and military domination. Military and to a growing extent political intervention by the West has indeed ended, but the impact of its science and culture, its technology, amenities and institutions remains and even increases. As in other parts of the non-Western world, this impact has been and will be enormous. In these circumstances, it is natural that Middle Easterners should continue to assume—and proceed on the assumption—that real responsibility and decision still lie elsewhere. In its crudest form, this belief leads to wild and strange conspiracy theories directed against those whom they regard as their enemies—Israel, and more generally the Jews, the United States, and more generally the West. No theory is too absurd to be asserted or too preposterous to be widely and instantly believed. Even among more responsible statesmen and analysts, a similar belief in alien power, albeit in a less crude form, often seems to guide both analysis and policy. Some even go so far as to invite outside intervention, presumable in the belief that only outside powers have the capacity to make and enforce decisions. A case in point is the constant appeal to the United States to involve itself in the Arab Israel conflict, oddly coupled with the repeated accusation of "American imperialism. " This state of mind is likely to continue for some time, with appeals for support or even intervention to the United States, to Russia and even to the European Union. In time, no doubt, Middle Eastern governments and people will learn how to use this window of opportunity to the best advantage—that is, of course, if the window remains open long enough.

单选题经济增长的标志是 。

单选题下列观点中不正确的是( )。 A．国民生产净值(NNP)减直接税等于国民收入(NI) B．国民生产净值(NNP)加资本折耗(折旧)等于GNP C．总投资等于净投资加折旧 D．个人收入等于个人可支配收入加直接税

单选题在生产函数F=ALaK1-a中，全要素生产率是指 。

单选题一般涌来衡量通货膨胀的物价指数是

单选题 货币乘数大小与多个变量有关，这些变量是 A、法定准备率； B、现金存款比率； C、超额准备率； D、以上都是。

单选题市场利率提高，银行的准备金会 。

单选题政府将新政税收100亿美元全部用于政府支出，这一举措的净效应是( )。

单选题下列选项中， 不是发展中国家经济发展的主要障碍。

单选题当经济达到繁荣时，会因 而转入衰退。

单选题技术进步会使短期总供给曲线( )，会使长期总供给曲线( )。 A．右移，右移 B．左移，左移 C．右移，不变 D．不变，右移

单选题在货币创造过程中，中央银行增发10亿现金，使公众的现金持有增加

单选题假定2008年的名义GDP是40000亿美元，价格指数是200(1978年的价格指数是100)，那么2008年的实际GDP以1978年的价格水平衡量相当于( )。 A．200亿美元 B．400亿美元 C．20000亿美元 D．40000亿美元 E．80000亿美元

单选题新凯恩斯主义认为，厂商对需求变动的反应是 。

单选题总供给曲线向右移可能是因为( )。 A．其他情况不变而厂商对劳动力需求增加 B．其他情况不变而所得税增加了 C．其他情况不变而原材料涨价 D．其他情况不变而劳动生产率下降

单选题IS曲线右上方、LM曲线左上方的组合表示

单选题经济中存在失业时，应运用的财政政策工具是

单选题如果国民生产总值(GNP)下降的原因是投资支出的下降，那么可以预计( )。 A．消费和储蓄都会减少 B．消费增加，但是储蓄会减少 C．消费减少，但储蓄会增加 D．消费和储蓄都不一定改变

单选题投资乘数在哪一种条件下最大( )。 A．边际储蓄倾向较小 B．边际储蓄倾向较大 C．边际消费倾向较小 D．边际储蓄倾向等于边际消费倾向

单选题如果价格在短期中固定不变，但在长期完全有弹性，则( )。 A．长期总供给曲线垂直 B．短期总供给曲线是水平的 C．货币供给量的变化在短期能够影响产出的变化，但是长期中没有影响 D．以上都正确