单选题Wednesday's Sales Meeting will begin 15 minutes earlier than planned boardroom as usual. What has changed? A. The day of the meeting. B. The time of the meeting. C. The place of the meeting.

单选题Dohertygotthesecretrecipesforjamfromhis

单选题Customer Service Centre Manager Wanted It's no use providing excellent services if the people they're designed for don't know about them, or aren't sure how to (29) them. That's why we're opening a Customer Service Centre in July which will provide a model for (30) more units of this type. The Centre will be on a busy high street so that everyone can see it. (31) the manager, you'll be the driving force behind this new venture. To work (32) this exciting new post, you should have at least two years' management experience in customer services. Your ability to think (33) and your knowledge of local businesses will (34) you to plan and run the operations of the Centre to the highest standards and (35) budget. (36) your strong leadership skills, you'll ensure a happy and open environment (37) all your people can develop, and the service (38) is always improving. You will need to communicate well, (39) with those working in the Centre and external contacts, and you will be required to (40) excellent presentation and negotiation skills.

单选题The last five digits of number 51512 identifies the manufacturer.

单选题Howdidthemansendtheparcelfinally?

单选题There will be a meeting at 14.00 tomorrow for all staff to discuss payment procedures. Sue Baker

单选题· Read the annual report about a company.· Choose the best word to fill in each gap, from A, B or C.· For each question (29-40), mark one letter (A, B or C) on your Answer Sheet. {{B}} Compact International{{/B}} This year has been an excellent year for Compact International. Our total sales have reached ￡42 million and sales in the UK show {{U}}(29) {{/U}} impressive 8% growth. In 2004 we {{U}}(30) {{/U}} forced to invest heavily in new technology. But the initial problems this caused have been balanced {{U}}(31) {{/U}} the excellent progress we have made. We are producing 23% more than three years {{U}}(32) {{/U}} Our success is partly due to our sales staff, {{U}}(33) {{/U}} have managed to find many new customers. {{U}}(34) {{/U}} hard work is a model for us all. The joint venture project in Indonesia began with many problems, {{U}}(35) {{/U}} we have now overcome most of them and we will start selling better in 2007. The project will be similar {{U}}(36) {{/U}} the one in Malaysia. The company {{U}}(37) {{/U}} begun a new training program for our employees. These have been so popular {{U}}(38) {{/U}} we will extend the program for one more year. If we can{{U}} (39) {{/U}}the number of employees who attend the program, there will surely be an increase {{U}}(40) {{/U}} our sales volume.

单选题Although the situation at the negotiation table is always changeable, it is necessary to make out a detailed plan for the forthcoming negotiation. "Top line" and "bottom line" should be decided. For many negotiations in which more complex issues exist than the single factor of price it is more useful to identify a "best achievable" top line. The negotiators of course hope for the best, but the fact is that their "best" is hardly satisfied. The limitation of the top line is affected by many factors. The negotiators should be "considerate" of the other party. They should not be too aggressive even when they are in a favourable position. They can not be too optimistic. If one party demands too much, the negotiation often results in a failure. The bottom line, on the other hand, is the last "line of defence" which the negotiators will not give up. When setting the bottom line, over-optimism about probable outcome is often linked to a failure to give the bottom line adequate consideration. Identifying the bottom line is perhaps more important than setting the original target. Flexibility in setting the best achievable target is essential.

单选题Whatdidtheytalkabout?

单选题Whatroomdoesthispersonwanttoknowifshecanchangeto?

单选题[此试题无题干]

单选题Whatdoesthewomanmean?

单选题You will need to travel in this job.

单选题Chocolates Menlinck Company Results Exports Target Exports This Year Exports Last Year 7,000 7,300 7,500A. This year's exports figures were not as good as last year's.B. Last year's exports figures failed to reach the exports target.C. This year's exports figures did not reach the exports target.

单选题The magician ______ the frog into a princess. A. transplanted B. transported C. transformed D. transmitted

单选题 Five years ago, Congress and President Bush made the most consequential and, as now seems more likely than not, unfortunate decision of this country's still young century. On October 16, 2002, Bush signed a resolution authorizing the US invasion of Iraq. Should war supporters apologize? Democrats certainly think so. In the five years since then, many of them have said "I told you so"—many more, in fact, than told us so. In a recent paper, Gary C. Jacobson, a political scientist at the University of California (San Diego), unearthed figure suggesting that some Democrats have edited their memories. Before the US invasion of Iraq, 46 percent of them favored the war, according to an average of a dozen surveys. In 2006, only 21 percent of them said they had favored the war. Hmm. Do the math. Those 25 percent of Democrats who were for the war until they had always been against it were probably not dissembling. They were just being human. "Memory is a self-justifying historian," says Carol Tavris, a social psychologist and a co-author (with Elliot Aronson) of the recent book Mistakes Were Made (but not by me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts. "Our memories are a better indication of what we believe and how we see ourselves today than of what actually happened." I believe her, because I was not above a little memory repair myself Recently, after a book review of mine appeared in The Washington Post, an angry reader wrote, "It will come as no surprise that Rauch was an advocate of invading Iraq." Who, me? I recalled myself as an agonized fence-sitter, more anti-anti-war than pro-war (an important distinction, you understand), maybe marginally in favor but more worried than convinced. Just double-checking, I reread my columns from the period and promptly found one, from February 2004, in which I described myself as an, er, "advocate of the war." Gee. Imagine that. So let me say for the record: I was wrong. Like most Americans, I have long since come to believe that the Iraq war was a strategic mistake—with luck. (Without luck, it will be a strategic calamity.) But let me also say what I was wrong about. In that February 2004 article, I called the war a "justified mistake." When a cop shoots a robber who has murdered in the past and who brandishes what looks like a gun, we blame the robber, not the cop—even if it turns out that the robber was brandishing a toy or a cellphone. The robber was asking for it, and so was Saddam Hussein. That answer, although still reasonable, no longer seems as convincing. Since 2004, it has become clearer that the Bush administration's prewar hype portrayed the intelligence on Saddam's alleged weapons of mass destruction as solider and starker than it really was. Not enough people, including people in the media, asked enough hard questions. I should have been more skeptical of the WMD hard sell. That was mistake No. 1. Mistake No. 2 was forgetting the difference between experts and poseurs. Over the past few years, it has become clearer that the hazards of the US occupation of Iraq were not unforeseeable. In fact, quite a few people foresaw them. And warned about them. And went unheeded. Partly that was because the Bush administration wasn't interested, but partly it was because a lot of us in the media gave a lot of ink and airtime to pontificators who had never been to Iraq, who had never fought in a war or served in an embassy or worked on a reconstruction team, and who did not know Iraq's language, culture, people, leaders, history, or region. Other than that, they were experts. In 2002 and 2003, of course, there was no way of knowing which of countless forecasts and opinions would prove correct. The experts were divided; sometimes fresh-eyed amateurs see what jaded experts miss; the previous US Iraq policy was no big success. All true. Still, the fact that so many of the war's sturdiest proponents were journalists and pundits—in other words, hacks, like me—should have rung more alarm bells. That was mistake No. 2. Those, however, were small mistakes compared with the fundamental one. It was not really a mistake about the war at all. It was a mistake about the president. Fool me twice, shame on me. In 1990, I was fooled once. In the prelude to the Persian Gulf War, I misjudged President George H.W. Bush. In those days, America's most resounding recent military triumphs had been against the Lilliputian forces of Panama and Grenada, against which weighed the 1975 defeat in Vietnam, the 1980 fiasco of Desert One (President Carter's failed hostage-rescue attempt in Iran), and the 1983 humiliation in Lebanon (where US forces turned tail after losing more than 200 marines to a Hezbollah truck bomb). Saddam Hussein's forces looked formidable and well entrenched in 1990. The sandstorms looked forbidding. And President George H.W. Bush looked hapless. I opposed the war. As I came to the 2002-2003 Iraq debate, I was determined not to make the same mistake twice. Another Bush was president, and the younger one looked as decisive as his father had once seemed dotty. This, after all, was the George W. Bush who had impressively rallied the nation and the world after September 11. His foreign-policy team looked easily the equal of his father's, or anybody's. Vice President Cheney was the wise man of Washington and the elder Bush's successful Defense secretary. Secretary of State Colin Powell was the magisterial architect of the Gulf War. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was the man whose plan had worked like a charm in Afghanistan. If Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, was not the equal of her 1990 predecessor, Brent Scowcroft, she was no lightweight. Surely if any war Cabinet could inspire confidence, this was it. Wrong again. Zero for two.

单选题What do we find out about Alan Robinson from the text?