People have wondered for a long time how their personalities and behaviors are formed, h is not easy to explain why one person is intelligent and another is not, or why one is cooperative and another is competitive. Social scientists are, of course, extremely interested in these types of questions. They want to explain why we possess certain characteristics and exhibit certain behaviors. There are no clear answers yet, but two distinct schools of thought on the matter have developed. As one might expect, the two approaches are very different from one another, and there is a great deal of debate between proponents of each theory. The controversy is often referred to as "nature/nurture". Those who support the "nature" side of the conflict believe that our personalities and behavior patterns are largely determined by biological and genetic factors. That our environment has little, if anything, to do with our abilities, characteristics, and behavior is central to this theory. Taken to an extreme, this theory maintains that our behavior is predetermined to such a degree that we are almost completely governed by our instincts. Proponents of the "nurture "theory, or, as they are often called, behaviorists, claimed that our environment is more important than our biologically based instincts in determining how we will act. A behaviorist, B. F. Skinner sees humans as beings whose behavior is almost completely shaped by their surroundings. The behaviorists' view of the human being is quite mechanistic; they maintain that, like machines, humans respond to environmental stimuli as the basis of their behavior. Either of these theories cannot yet fully explain human behavior. In fact, it is quite likely that the key to our behavior lies somewhere between these two extremes. That the controversy will continue for a long time is certain. Which one of the following statements would supporters of the "nature" theory agree with?
Generally speaking
A. Vista will also have consumer appeal
When older people can no longer remember names at a cocktail party
Science and its practical applications in the form of technology, or the "science" of the industrial arts, as Webster defines the term, have had an enormous impact on modem society and culture. For generations it was believed that science and technology would provide the solutions to the problem of human suffering disease, famine, war, and poverty. But today these problems remain; in fact, many argue that they are expanding. Some even conclude that science and technology as presently constituted are not capable of meeting the collective needs of mankind. A more radical position is that modem scientific methods and institutions, because of their very nature and structure, thwart basic human needs and emotions; the catastrophes of today's world, and the greatest threat to its future, some claim, are the direct consequences of science and technology. A major paradox has been created: scientific rationality taken as the supreme form of the application of the rational faculties of human beings and which, along with its practical applications in the form of technological development, have liberated man from ignorance, from the whims and oppressions of a relentless nature and while having subordinated the earth to man, has become the potential instrument of the self-destruction of the human species. War, pollution, and economic oppression are seen as the inevitable results of scientific advance by large sections of the public. The atomic disaster of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are seen as the products of an uninterested scientific rationality. In recent decades in the West there has emerged a wave of anti-scientific, antirational moods, especially among the young people, which threatens a complete rejection not simply of the technological fruits of science, but of scientific rationalism as well, in favor of one or another version of mysticism, irrationalism, and primitivism-or as one philosopher of science has called it, of blood and soil philosophy. Wartovsky has described the argument of the anti-science people as one in which we are warned to "listen to the blood, get back to our roots, and cast out the evil demons of a blind and inhuman rationality, and thereby we will save ourselves". The only "reasonable thing" to do, according to the oppositionist, is to reject reason itself-at least in its scientific form. The very rejection of that reason, in "reasonable" terms, is in itself a paradox. According to Paragraph 1, science and technology hindered humans' needs and emotions in that
The main problem in discussing American popular culture is also one of its main characteristics: it
Any fair-minded assessment of the dangers of the deal between Britain's National Health Service (NHS) and DeepMind must start by acknowledging that both sides mean well. DeepMind is one of the leading artificial intelligence (AI) companies in the world. The potential of this work applied to health-care is very great, but it could also lead to further concentration of power in the tech giant. It is against that background that the information commissioner, Elizabeth Denham, has issued her damning verdict against the Royal Free hospital trust under the NHS, which handed over to DeepMind the records of 1.6 million patients in 2015 on the basis of a vague agreement which took far too little account of the patients' rights and their expectations of privacy. DeepMind has almost apologized. The NHS trust has mended its ways. Further arrangements—and there may be many—between the NHS and DeepMind will be carefully scrutinised to ensure that all necessary permissions have been asked of patients and all unnecessary data has been cleaned. There are lessons about informed patient consent to learn. But privacy is not the only angle in this case and not even the most important. Ms Denham chose to concentrate the blame on the NHS trust, since under existing law it "controlled" the data and DeepMind merely "processed" it. But this distinction misses the point that it is processing and aggregation, not the mere possession of bits, that gives the data value. The great question is who should benefit from the analysis of all the data that our lives now generate. Privacy law builds on the concept of damage to an individual from identifiable knowledge about them. That misses the way the surveillance economy works. The data of an individual there gains its value only when it is compared with the data of countless millions more. The use of privacy law to curb the tech giants in this instance feels slightly maladapted. This practice does not address the real worry. It is not enough to say that the algorithms DeepMind develops will benefit patients and save lives. What matters is that they will belong to a private monopoly which developed them using public resources. If software promises to save lives on the scale that drugs now can, big data may be expected to behave as big pharma has done. We are still at the beginning of this revolution and small choices now may turn out to have gigantic consequences later. A long struggle will be needed to avoid a future of digital feudalism. Ms Denham's report is a welcome start. What is true of the agreement between the NHS and DeepMind?
In the 2006 film version of em>The Devil/em> Wears Prada, Miranda Priestly, played by Meryl Streep, scolds her unattractive assistant for imagining that high fashion doesn't affect her, Priestly explains how the deep blue color of the assistant's sweater descended over the years from fashion shows to departments stores and to the bargain bin in which the poor girl doubtless found her garment. This top-down conception of the fashion business couldn't be more out of date or at odds with the feverish world described in Overdressed, Elizabeth Cline's three-year indictment of "fast fashion". In the last decade or so, advances in technology have allowed mass-market labels such as Zara, HM, and Uniqlo to react to trends more quickly and anticipate demand more precisely. Quicker turnarounds mean less wasted inventory, more frequent release, and more profit. These labels encourage style-conscious consumers to see clothes as disposable—meant to last only a wash or two, although they don't advertise that—and to renew their wardrobe every few weeks. By offering on-trend items at dirt-cheap prices, Cline argues, these brands have hijacked fashion cycles, shaking an industry long accustomed to a seasonal pace. The victims of this revolution, of course, are not limited to designers. For HM to offer a $5.95 knit miniskirt in all its 2,300-pius stores around the world, it must rely on low-wage overseas labor, order in volumes that strain natural resources, and use massive amounts of harmful chemicals. em>Overdressed/em> is the fashion world's answer to consumer-activist bestsellers like Michael Pollan's The em>Omnivore's Dilemma/em>. "Mass-produced clothing, like fast food, fills a hunger and need, yet is non-durable and wasteful," Cline argues. Americans, she finds, buy roughly 20 billion garments a year—about 64 items per person—and no matter how much they give away, this excess leads to waste. Towards the end of Overdressed, Cline introduced her ideal, a Brooklyn woman named Sarah Kate Beaumont, who since 2008 has made all of her own clothes—and beautifully. But as Cline is the first to note, it took Beaumont decades to perfect her craft; her example can't be knocked off. Though several fast-fashion companies have made efforts to curb their impact on labor and the environment—including HM, with its green Conscious Collection line—Cline believes lasting change can only be effected by the customer. She exhibits the idealism common to many advocates of sustainability, be it in food or in energy. Vanity is a constant; people will only start shopping more sustainably when they can't afford not to. Priestly criticizes her assistant for her
The family is the center of most traditional Asians' lives. Many people worry about their families' welfare, reputation, and honor. Asian families are often 21 , including several generations related by 22 or marriage living in the same home. An Asian person's misdeeds are not blamed just on the individual but also on the family—including the dead 23 . Traditional Chinese, among many other Asians, respect their elders and feel a deep sense of duty 24 them. Children repay their parents' 25 by being successful and supporting them in old age. This is accepted as a 26 part of life in China. 27 , taking care of the aged parents is often viewed as a tremendous 28 in the United States, where aging and family support are not 29 highly. 30 , in the youth-oriented United States, growing old is seen as a bad thing and many old people do not receive respect. Pilipinos, the most Americanized of the Asians, are 31 extremely family-oriented. They are 32 to helping their children and will sacrifice greatly for their children to get an education. 33 , the children are devoted to their parents, who often live nearby. Grown children who leave the country for economic reasons 34 send large parts of their income home to their parents. The Vietnamese family 35 people currently 36 as well as the spirits of the dead and of the as-yet unborn. Any 37 or actions are done from family considerations, not individual desires. People's behavior is judged 38 whether it brings shame or pride to the family. The Vietnamese do not particularly believe in self-reliance; in this way, they are the 39 of people in the United States. Many Vietnamese think that their actions in this life will influence their 40 in the next life.
A. The upshot was the same as her findings from the World Values Survey
WhilecoalproductionandusedroppedsignificantlyinAmerica,inEurope"wehavesomekindofgoldenageofcoal,"saysAnneSophieCorbeauoftheInternationalEnergyAgency.Theamountofelectricity1fromcoalisrisingatanannual2of50%insomeEuropeancountries.Sincecoalisthe3pollutingsourceofelectricity,withmoregreenhousegasproducedperKWH(千瓦时)thananyotherfossilfuel,thisis4toEuropeanenvironmentalaspirations.5didithappen?AsAmericanutilities6intogas,Americancoalminershadto7fornewmarkets.ThishappenedwhenslowingChinesedemandwaspushingdownworldcoalprices,whichmakeEuropeanutilities8buyers.Comparedwiththerock-bottompriceofgasinAmerica,coalisnot9thatcheap.Butitisa10comparedwiththegaspriceinEurope.11gascanbecartedaroundinliquidform,thatisexpensiveandtheinfrastructurerequiredisstillpatchy;forthemostpart,gasisshiftedthroughpipelines,andtendstobeused12towhereitoriginates.So13coalhasworld-marketprices,gashasregionalprices,often14inonewayoranothertotheoilprice.ManyEuropeangascontractswere15yearsagowiththeRussiangasgiant,Gazprom,andgaspriceshave16high.Gazpromhassaiditwillcutprices,butthatmaymakelittledifference.SocoalischeaperthangasinEuropeandis17toremainso,partlybecauseEurope'sdomesticgasindustryismanyyears18America'sandpartlybecauseitwilltaketimeforEuropetobuildaninfrastructuretoimport19naturalgasinlargeamounts.PowerutilitiesinGermanywereset,20,tolose11.70whentheyburnedgastomakeaMW(兆瓦特)ofelectricity,buttoearn14.22perMWwhentheyburnedcoal.
Transatlantic friction between companies and regulators has grown as Europe's data guardians have become more assertive. Francesca Bignami, a professor at George Washington University's law school, says that the explosion of digital technologies has made it impossible for watchdogs to keep a close eye on every web company operating in their backyard. So instead they are relying more on scapegoating prominent wrongdoers in the hope that this will deter others. But regulators such as Peter Schaar, who heads Germany's federal data-protection agency, say the gulf is exaggerated. Some European countries, he points out, now have rules that make companies who suffer big losses of customer data to report these to the authorities. The inspiration for these measures comes from America. Yet even Mr. Schaar admits that the internet's global scale means that there will need to be changes on both sides of the Atlantic. He hints that Europe might adopt a more flexible regulatory stance if America were to create what amounts to an independent data-protection body along European lines. In Europe, where the flagship Data Protection Directive came into effect in 1995, the European Commission is conducting a review of its privacy policies. In America Congress has begun debating a new privacy bill and the Federal Trade Commission is considering an overhaul of its rules. Even if America and Europe do narrow their differences, internet firms will still have to struggle with other data watchdogs. In Asia countries that belong to APEC are trying to develop a set of regional guidelines for privacy rules under an initiative known as the Data Privacy Pathfinder. Some countries such as Australia and New Zealand have longstanding privacy laws, but many emerging nations have yet to roll out fully fledged versions of their own. Mr. Polonetsky sees Asia as "a new privacy battleground", with America and Europe both keen to tempt countries towards their own regulatory model. Canada already has something of a hybrid privacy regime, which may explain why its data-protection commissioner, Jennifer Stoddart, has been so influential on the international stage. She marshaled the signatories of the Google Buzz letter and took Facebook to task last year for breaching Canada's data privacy laws, which led the company to change its policies. Ms Stoddart argues that American companies often trip up on data-privacy issues because of "their brimming optimism that the whole world wants what they have rolled out in America." Yet the same optimism has helped to create global companies that have brought huge benefits to consumers, while also presenting privacy regulators with tough choices. Shoehorning such firms into old privacy frameworks will not benefit either them or their users. According to paragraph 1, web watchdogs ______.
A. Analyzing your own taste B. Being cautious when experimenting C
In a sweeping change to how most of its 1
Marion Nestle's heavyweight polemic against Coca-Cola and PepsiCo comes at an odd moment for the industry. Americans are drinking fewer 1 sodas—in the past year production was 23% below what it had been a decade earlier and even sales of diet drinks are losing their fizz, as consumers question the 2 of artificial sweeteners. Yet in America companies still produce 30 gallons of 3 (not diet) fizzy drinks per person per year. Drinking a lot of sweet fizzy drinks is 4 unhealthy. Unlike a Big Mac, they have no nutritional 5 ; nor do their calories 6 hunger. One large study found that for each could be added to a person's daily diet, the risk of diabetes 7 by 22%. There are also links between sugar and heart disease, stroke and cancer. Fizzy drink companies 8 Ms. Nestle describes as an extraordinarily broad team of allies are skilled at escaping from 9 at regulation. That 10 friends, such as employees, bottlers and distributors, as well as the restaurants, cinemas, shops and sports stadiums that 11 their products. But the companies are also astute 12 . In 2011 Philadelphia was 13 a soda tax. After the soda lobby offered a big donation to the city's children's hospital, the idea 14 . Drinks companies must also 15 with a small army of health advocates, among which Ms. Nestle is a major-general. 16 the slow decline of soda in America, she and her allies are 17 . Coca-Cola and PepsiCo are peddling healthier drinks, such as bottled water. 18 , as they try to face down a long-term threat while 19 near-term profits, they are still 20 their syrupy fare.
The horse and carriage is thing of the past
There is an old saying that philosophy bakes no bread
Recently
The United States is widely recognized to have a private economy because privately owned businesses play 21 roles. The American free enterprise system 22 private ownership more than public sectors. Private businesses produce 23 goods and services, 24 almost two-thirds of the nation's total economic output goes to 25 for personal use. The consumer role is 26 great, in fact, that the nation is sometimes characterized as having a " 27 economy" This emphasis 28 private ownership arises, 29 , from American beliefs about personal freedom. From the time the nation was 30 , Americans have 31 excessive government power, and they have sought to 32 government's authority over individuals—including its role in the economic realm. 33 , Americans generally believe that an economy largely with private ownership is likely to operate more 34 than 35 with substantial government ownership. When economic forces are unfettered, Americans believe, supply and demand 36 the price of good and services. Prices, in turn, tell businesses what to produce; if people want more of a particular good than the economy is producing, the price of the goods 37 . That catches the attention of new or other companies that, 38 an opportunity to earn profit, start producing more 39 that goods. On the other hand, if people want less of the goods, prices fall and less competitive producers either go out of business or start producing 40 goods.
If the 1980s were about quality and the 1990s were about re-engineering
