单选题Corpus linguistics deals with the principles and practice of using corpora in language study. It is a collection of linguistic data, either compiled as written texts or as a transcription of recorded speech.

单选题The people so often sleepy, weary, enigmatic,is a vast huddle with many units saying:"I earn my living.I make enough to get byand it takes all my time.If I had more timeI could do more for myselfand maybe for others.I could read and studyand talk things overand find out about things.It takes time.I wish I had the time. "The following lines are taken from______.

单选题Minimizing the environmental damage that new roads cause is generally regarded as a good thing. But to do that, it helps to understand just how new roads cause the damage of which they are accused. Recently, a group of researchers led by Dr Gonzalez conducted an experiment which shows what ecologists have long suspected, but never been able to prove: that immigration is good for the health of animal populations. A road destroys only a small part of the habitat it traverses, and thus annihilates just a few local populations of creatures. So the argument that road-building itself is bad for biodiversity is not self-evidently correct. Those who nevertheless hold this view usually point to a piece of ecological theory called "meta-population dynamics". This says that apparently separate local populations of animals are, in fact, parts of much larger populations connected via migration. According to this theory, when a local population flounders—because of an epidemic, for example—individuals from neighboring communities can fill the gaps. So the more such communities there are, the better the chance of given local population remaining healthy. The implications of the theory for conservation are straightforward. Cut local populations off from each other and each is more likely to disappear. And roads are good at doing just that. Testing the theory with experimental roads, however, would be expensive. Dr Gonzalez's brainwave was to do the whole thing on a much smaller scale. Instead of studying, say, a forest, the team looked at moss-covered rocks. These support diverse population of tiny arthropods(insects, mites and so on). On some rocks the researchers left the moss untouched; on others they scraped "roadways" across to leave "isolated". After waiting six months, they found that in the disturbed habitats nearly all the bug population had declined compared with the undisturbed moss, and 40% of the species had become extinct. The real test of the meta-population hypothesis came in the second part of the experiment. In this, the researchers scraped away moss much as before, but they left narrow moss paths to bridge the no-bug's-land between islands. These connected patches were still not as healthy after six months as the unsullied moss, but they did far better than isolated islands—a result that supports the notion that population exchange is necessary to keep an ecosystem healthy. Whether these results can be translated to large-scale ecosystems remains uncertain. But if they can, they would cause more, not less, concern about the ecological effects of road-building. On the other hand, they also suggest a way out. In Britain, tunnels are often built under roads for animals of regular habits, such as badgers, to be able to travel their traditional routes without having to tangle with traffic. Extending that principle, perhaps with special bridges that can support local vegetation and thus allow animals the illusion of an uninterrupted habitat, might be a cheap way of letting man and nature rub along a bit better.

单选题He kept the portrait ______he could see it every day, as it always reminded him of his early school days.

单选题The last sound of "sit" can be articulated as an unreleased or released plosive. These different realizations of the same phoneme are not in complementary distribution. (北二外2009研)

单选题The Minister"s ______ answer let to an outcry from the Opposition.

单选题Everyone must have had at least one personal experience with a computer error by this time. Bank balances are suddenly reported to have jumped from $379 into the millions, appeals for charitable contributions are mailed over and over to people with crazy-sounding names at your address, department stores send the wrong bills, utility companies write that they"re turning everything off, that sort of thing. If you manage to get it touch with someone and complain, you then get instantaneously typed, guilty letters from the same computer, saying, "Our computer was in error, and adjustment is being made in your account." I wonder whether this can be true. After all, the whole point of computer is that they represent an extension of the human brain, vastly improved upon but nonetheless human, superhuman maybe. A good computer can think clearly and quickly enough to beat you at chess, and some of them have even been programmed to write obscure verse. They can do anything we can do, and more besides. It is not yet known whether a computer has its own consciousness, and it would be hard to find out about this. When you walk into one of those great halls now built for the huge machines, and stand listening, it is easy to imagine that the faint, distant noises are the sound of thinking, and the turning of the spools gives them the look of wild creatures rolling their eyes in the effort to concentrate, choking with information. But real thinking, and dreaming, are other matters. On the other hand, the evidences of something like an unconscious, equivalent to ours, are all around, in every mail. As extensions of the human brain, they have been constructed with the same property of error, spontaneous, uncontrolled, and rich in possibilities. Mistakes are at very base of human thought, embedded there, feeding the structure like root nodules. If we were not provided with the knack of being wrong, we could never get anything useful done. We think our way along by choosing between right and wrong alternatives, and the wrong choices have to be made as frequently as the right ones. We get along in life this way. We built to make mistakes, coded for error. A good laboratory, like a good bank or a corporation or government, has to run like a computer. Almost everything is done flawlessly, by the book, and all the numbers add up to the predicted sums. The days go by. And then, if it is a lucky day, and a lucky laboratory, somebody makes a mistake: the wrong buffer, something in one of the blanks, a decimal misplaced in reading counts, the warm room off by a degree and a half, a mouse out of his box, or just misreading of the day"s protocol. Whatever, when the results come in, something is obviously screwed up, and then the action can begin.The misreading is not the important error; it opens the way. The next step is the crucial one. If the investigator can bring himself to say, "But even so, look at that!" then the new finding, whatever it is, is ready for snatching. What is needed, for progress to be made, is the base on the error. Whenever new kinds of thinking are about to be accomplished, or new varieties of music, there has to be an argument beforehand. With two sides debating in the same mind, haranguing, there is an amiable understanding that One is right and the other wrong. Sooner or later the thing is settled, but there can be no action at all if there are not the two sides, and the argument. The hope is in the faculty of wrongness, the tendency toward error. The capacity to leap across mountains of information to land lightly on the wrong side represents the highest of human endowments. It may be that this is a uniquely human gift, perhaps even stipulated in our genetic instructions. Other creatures do not seem to have DNA sequences for making mistakes as a routine part of daily living, certainly not for programmed error as a guide for action. We are at our human finest, dancing with our minds, when there are more choices than two. Sometimes there are ten, even twenty different ways to go, all but one bound to be wrong, and the richness of selection in such situations can lift us onto totally new ground. This process is called exploration and is based on human fallibility. If we had only a single center in our brain, capable of responding only when a correct decision was to be made, instead of the jumble of different, credulous, easily conned clusters of neurons that provide for being flung off into blind alleys, up trees, down dead ends, out into blue sky, along wrong turnings, around bends, we could only stay the way we are today, struck fast. The lower animals do not have this splendid freedom. They are limited, most of them, to absolute infallibility. Cats, for all their good side, never make mistake charming minor mistakes, but they get this way by trying to mimic their masters. Fish are flawless in everything they do. Individual cells in a tissue are mindless machines, perfect in their performance, as absolutely inhuman as bees. We should have this in mind as we become dependent on more complex computers for the arrangement of our affairs. Give the computers their heads, I say; let them go their way. If we learn to do this, turning our heads to one side and wincing while the work proceeds, the possibilities for the future of mankind, and computer kind, are limitless. Your average good computer can make calculations in all instant, which would take a lifetime of slide rules or any of us. Think of what we could gain from the near infinity of precise, machine-made miscomputation which is now so easily within our grasp. We could begin the solving of some of our hardest problems. How, for instance, should we go about organizing ourselves for social living on a planetary scale, now that we have become, as a plain fact of life, a single community? We can assume, as a working hypothesis, that all the right ways of doing this are unworkable. What we need, then, for moving ahead, is a set of wrong alternatives much longer and more interesting than the short list of mistaken courses that any of us can think up right now. We need, in fact, an infinite list, and when it is printed out we need the computer to turn on itself and select at random the next way to go. If it is a big enough mistake, we could find ourselves on a new level, stunned, out in the clear, ready to move again.

单选题Because the Romantic Period is a period of the great flowering American literature, it is also called______.

单选题The sense relation which holds the pair of words richer—poorer is ______.

单选题______is one of the suprasegmental features.

单选题______that even the great fortune he inherited from his father could not sustain his life.

单选题In addition to urge to conform which we generate ourselves, there is the external pressure of the various formal and informal groups we belong to, the pressure to back their ideas and attitudes and to imitate their actions. Thus our urge to conform receives continuing, even daily reinforcement. To be sure, the intensity of the reinforcement, like the strength of urge and the ability and inclination to withstand it, differs widely among individuals. Yet some pressure is present for everyone. And in one way or another, to some extent, everyone yields to it. It is possible that a new member of a temperance group might object to the group"s rigid insistence that all drinking of alcoholic beverages is wrong. He might even speak out, reminding them that occasional, moderate drinking is not harmful, that even the Bible speaks approvingly of it. But the group may quickly let him know that such ideas are unwelcome in their presence. Every time he forgets this, he will be made to feel uncomfortable. In time if he values their companionship he will avoid expressing that point of view. He may even keep himself from thinking. This kind of pressure, whether spoken or unspoken, can be generated by any group, regardless of how liberal or conservative, formal or casual it may be. Friday night poker clubs, churches, political parties, committees, fraternities, unions. The teenage gang that steals automobile accessories may seem to have to taboos. But let one uneasy member remark that he is beginning to feel guilty about his crimes and their wrath will descend on him. Similarly, in high school and college, the crowd a student travels with has certain(usually unstated)expectations for its members. If they drink or smoke, they will often make the member who does not do so feel that he doesn"t fully belong. If a member does not share their views on sex, drugs, studying, cheating, or any other subject of importance to them, they will communicate their displeasure. The way they communicate, of course, may be more or less direct. They may tell him he"d better conform "or else". They may launch a teasing campaign against him. Or they may be even less obvious and leave him out of their activities for a few days until he asks what is wrong or decides for himself and resolves to behave more like them. The urge to conform on occasion conflicts with the tendency to resist change. If group we are in advocates an idea or action that is new and strange to us, we can be torn between seeking their acceptance and maintaining the security of familiar ideas and behavior. In such cases, the way we turn will depend on which tendency is stronger in us or which value we are more committed to. More often, however, the two tendencies do not conflict but reinforce each other. For we tend to associate with those whose attitudes and actions are similar to our own.

单选题Two words, or two expressions, which have the same semantic components, will be synonymous to each other.

单选题______is often the case with a new idea, much preliminary activity and optimistic discussion produced no concrete proposals.

单选题The functions of language do NOT include______. (大连外国语学院2008研)

单选题Questions 52 -54 are based on the following lines.

单选题We are entering a period in which rapid population growth, the presence of deadly weapons, and dwindling resources will bring international tensions to dangerous levels for an extended period. Indeed, 1 seems no reason for these levels of danger to subside unless population equilibrium is 2 and some rough measure of fairness reached in the distribution of wealth among nations. 3 of adequate magnitude imply a willingness to redistribute income internationally on a more generous 4 than the advanced nations have evidenced within their own domains. The required increases in 5 in the backward regions would necessitate gigantic applications of energy merely to extract the 6 resources. It is uncertain whether the requisite energy-producing technology exists, and more serious, 7 that its application would bring us to the threshold of an irreversible change in climate 8 a consequence of the enormous addition of manmade heat to the atmosphere. It is this 9 problem that poses the most demanding and difficult of the challenges. The existing 10 of industrial growth, with no allowance for increased industrialization to repair global poverty, hold 11 the risk of entering the danger zone of climatic change in as 12 as three or four generations. If the trajectory is in fact pursued, industrial growth will 13 have to come to an immediate halt, for another generation or two along that 14 would literally consume human, perhaps all life. The terrifying outcome can be postponed only to the extent that the wastage of heat can be reduced, 15 that technologies that do not add to the atmospheric heat burden—for example, the use of solar energy—can be utilized. (1996)

单选题For three quarters of its span on Earth, life evolved almost ______ as microorganisms.

单选题When I was told I had won first prize in the speech contest, I had to______myself to make sure I wasn't dreaming.

单选题On the Relation between Art and Society Theodor Adorno Aesthetic refraction is as incomplete without the retracted object as imagination is without the imagined object. This has special significance for the problem of the inherent functionality of art. Tied to the real world, art adopts the principle of self-preservation of that world, turning it into the idem of self-identical art, the essence of which Schonberg once summed up in the statement that the painter paints a picture rather than what it represent. Implied here is the idea that every work of art spontaneously aims at being identical with itself, just as in the world outside a fake identity is everywhere forcibly imposed on objects by the insatiable subject. Aesthetic identity is different, however, in one important respect: it meant to assist the non-identical in its struggle against the repressive identification compulsion that rules the outside world. It is by virtue of its separation from empirical reality that the work of art can become a being of a higher order, fashioning the relation between the whole and its parts in accordance with its own needs. Works of art are after-images or replicas of empirical life, inasmuch as they proffer to the latter what in the outside world is being denied them. In the process they slough off a repressive, external-empirical mode of experiencing the artist, it must be kept in mind that works of art are alive, have a life sui generic. Their life is more than just an outside fate. Over time, great works reveal new facets of themselves, they age, they become rigid, and they die. Being human artifacts, they do not "live" in the same sense as human beings. Of course not. To put he accent on the art factual aspect in works of art seems to imply that the way in which they came to be is important. It is not. The emphasis must be on their inner constitution. They have life because they speak in ways nature an man cannot. They talk because there is communication between their individual constituents, which cannot be said of things that exist in a state of mere diffusion. As artifacts, works of art communicate not only internally but also with the external reality which they try to get away from and which none the less is the substratum of their content. Art negates the conceptualization foisted on the real world and yet harbors in its own substance elements of the empirically existent. Assuming that one has to differentiate form and content before grasping their mediation, we can say that art's opposition to the real world is in the realm of form; but this occurs, generally speaking, in a mediated way such that aesthetic form is a sedimentation of content. What seem like pure forms in art, namely those of traditional music, do in all respects, and all the way down to details of musical idiom, derive from external content such as dance. Similarly, ornaments in the visual arts originally tended to be cult symbols. Members of the Warberg Institute were following this lead, studying the derivability of aesthetic forms from contents in the context of classical antiquity and its influence on later periods. This kind of work needs to be undertaken on a large scale. The manner in which art communicates with the outside world is in fact also a lack of communication, because art seeks, blissfully or unhappily, to seclude itself from the world. This noncommunication points to the fractured nature of art. It is natural to think that art's autonomous domain has no more in common with the outside world than a few borrowed elements undergoing radical change in the context of art. But there is more to it than that. There is some truth to the historical cliche which states that the developments of artistic methods, usually lumped together under the term "style", correspond to social development. Even the most sublime work of art takes up a definite position Visa-vis reality by stepping outside of reality spell, not abstractly once and for all, but occasionally and in concrete ways, when it unconsciously and tacitly polemicizes against the condition of society at a particular point in time. How can works of art be like windowless monads, representing something which is other than them? There is only one way to explain this, which is to view them as being subject to a dynamic or immanent historicity and a dialectical tension between nature and domination of nature, a dialectic that seems to be of the same kind as the dialectic of society, or to put it more cautiously, the dialectic of art resembles the social dialectic without consciously imitating it. The productive force of useful labor and that of art are the same. They both have he same teleology. And what might be termed aesthetic relations of production—defined as everything that provides an outlet for the productive forces of art or everything in which these forces become embedded—are sedimentations of social relations of production bearing the imprint of the latter. Thus in all dimension of its productive process art has a twofold essence, being both an autonomous entity and a social fact in the Durkheimian sense of the term. It is through this relationship to the empirical that work of art salvage, albeit in neutralized fashion, something that once upon a time was literally a shared experience of all mankind and which enlightenment had since expelled. Art, too, partakes of enlightenment; but in a different way: works of art do not lie; what they say is literally true. Their reality however lies in the fact that they are answers to questions brought before them from outside. The tension in art therefore has meaning only in . relation to the tension outside. The fundamental layers of artistic experience are akin to the objective world from which art recoils. The unresolved antagonisms of reality reappear in art in the guise of immanent problems of artistic form. This, and not the dilate injection of objective moments or social content, defines art's relation to society. The aesthetic tensions manifesting themselves in works of art express the essence of reality in and through their emancipation from the factual facade of exteriority. Art's simultaneous dissociation from and secret connection with empirical being confirms the strength of Hegel's analysis of the nature of a conceptual barrier: the intellect, argues Hegel against Kant, no sooner posits a barrier than it has to go beyond it, absorbing into itself that against which the barrier was set up. We have here, among other things, a basis for a non-moralistic critique of the idea of l'art pour l'art with its abstract negation of the empirical and with its monomaniac separatism in aesthetic theory. Freedom, the presupposition of art and the self glorifying conception art has of itself, is the cunning of art's reason. Blissfully soaring above the real world, art is still chained by each of its elements to the empirical other, into which it may even sink back altogether at every instant. In their relation to empirical reality works of art recall the ologumenon that in a state of redemption everything will be just as it and yet wholly different. There is an unmistakable similarity in all this with the development of the profane. The profane secularizes the sacred realm to the point where the latter is the only secular thing left. The sacred realm is thus objectified, staked out as it were, because its moment of untruth awaits secularization as much as it tries to avert it through incantation. It follows that art is not defined once and for all by the scope of an immutable concept. Rather, the concept of art is a fragile balance attained now and then, quite similar to the psychological equilibrium between id and ego. Disturbances continually upset the balance, keeping the process in motion. Every work of art is an instant; every great work of art is a stoppage of the process, a momentary standing still, whereas a persistent eye sees only the process. While it is true that works of art provide answers to their own questions, it is equally true that in so doing they become questions for themselves. Take a look at the widespread inclination(which to this day has not been mitigated by education)to perceive art in terms of extra-aesthetic or pre-aesthetic criteria. This tendency is, on the one hand, a mark of atrocious backwardness or of the recessive consciousness of many people. On the other hand, a mark of atrocious backwardness or of the recessive consciousness of many people. On the other hand, there is no denying that that tendency is promoted by something in art itself. If art is perceived strictly in aesthetic terms, then it cannot be properly perceived in aesthetic terms. The artist must feel the presence of the empirical other in the foreground of his own experience in order to be able to sublimate that experience, thus freeing himself from his confinement to content while at the same time saving he being-for-itself of art from slipping into outright indifference toward the world. Art is and is not being-for-itself. Without a heterogeneous moment, art cannot achieve autonomy. Great epics that survive their own oblivion were originally shot through with historical and geographical reporting. Valery, for one, was aware of the degree to which the Homeric, pagan-germanic and Christian epics contained raw materials that had never been melted down and recast by the laws of form., noting that this did not diminish their tank in comparison with "pure" works of art. Similarly, tragedy, the likely origin of the abstract idea of aesthetic autonomy, was also an after-image of pragmatically oriented cult acts. At no point in its history of progressive emancipation was art able to stamp out that moment, And the reason is not that the bonds were simply too strong. Long before socialist realism rationally planned its debasement, the realistic novel, which was at its height as a literary form in the 19th century, bears the marks of reportage, anticipating what was later to become the task of social science surveys. Conversely, the fanatic thoroughness of linguistic integration that characterizes Madame Bovary, for instance, is probably the result of the contrary moment. The continued relevance of this work is due to the unity of both. In art, the criterion of success is twofold: first, works of art must be able to integrate materials and details into their immanent law of form; and, second, they must not try to erase the fractures left by the process of integration. Integration as such does not guarantee quality. There is no privileged single category, not even the aesthetically central one of form, which defined the essence of art and suffices to judge its product. In short, art has defining characteristics that go against the grain of what philosophy of art ordinarily conceives as art. Hegel is the exception. His aesthetics of content recognized the moment of otherness inherent in art, thus superseding the old aesthetic of form. The latter seems to be operating with too pure a concept of art, even though it has at least one advantage, which is that it does not, unlike Hegel's(and Kierkegaaed's)substantive aesthetics, place obstacles in the way of certain historical developments such as abstract painting. This is one weakness of art regresses to a position that can only be called "pre -aesthetic" and crude, Hegel mistakes, the replicatory or discursive treatment of contend for the kind of otherness that is constitutive of art. He sins, as it were, against his own dialectical concept of aesthetics, with results that he could not foresee. He in effect helped prepare the way of the bonuses tendency to transform art into an ideology of repression. The moment of unreality and non-existence in art is not independent of the existent, as though it were posited or invented by some arbitrary will. Rather, that moment of unreality is structure resulting from quantitative relations between elements of being, relations which are in turn a response to, and an echo of, the imperfections of real conditions, their constraints, their contradictions, and their potentialities. Art is related to its other like a magnet to a field of iron filings. The elements of art as well as their constellation, or what is commonly thought to be he spiritual essence of art, point back to the real other. The identity of the works of art with existent reality also accounts for the centripetal force that enables tern to gather unto themselves the traces and membra disiecta of real life. Their affinity with the world lies in a principle that is conceived to be a contrast to that world but is in fact no different from the principle whereby spirit has dominated the world. Synthesis is not some process of imposing order on the elements of work of art. It is important, rather, that the elements interact with each other; hence there is a sense in which synthesis is a mere repetition of the pre-established interdependence among elements, where interdependence is a product of otherness, of non-art. Synthesis, therefore, is firmly grounded in the material aspects of works of art. There is a link between the aesthetic moment of form an non-violence. In its difference from the existent, art of necessity constitutes itself in terms of that which is not a work of art yet is indispensable for its being. The emphasis on non-intentionality in art, noticeable first in the sympathy for popular art in Apollinaire, early Cubism and Wedekind(who derided what he called "art-artists")indicates that art became aware, however dimly, that it interacted with its opposite. This new self conceptions of art gave rise to a critical turn signaling an eng to the illusory equation of art with pure spirituality.Notes:(1)Sui generis:(Latin)of its own kind; peculiar; unique.(2)Vis-a-vis:(French)regarding; in relation to.(3)I'artpour Tart;(French)art for art's sake.(4)membra disiecta:(Latin)scattered parts.A. Please judge whether the following statements are true or false by marking T for true and F for false.