问答题automatic control

问答题intexticated

问答题greenhouse gases

问答题Chairman of the Board

问答题厉行节约

问答题Students (and others) often, as I said earlier, talk about "using" this or that approach—"I think I"ll use Durkheim"—as though they had a free choice of theories. In fact, by the time they begin to write about their research, they have made many seemingly unimportant choices of details that have foreclosed their choice of a theoretical approach. They decided what questions to investigate. They picked a way of gathering information. They chose between a variety of minor technical and procedural alternatives: who to interview, how to code their data, when to stop. As they made these choices from day to day, they increasingly committed themselves to one way of thinking, more or less firmly answering the theoretical questions they thought were still up for grabs. But sociologists, and especially students, fuss about choosing a theory for a practical reason. They have to—at least they think they do—deal with the "literature" on their topic. Scholars learn to fear the literature in graduate school. I remember Professor Louis Wirth, one of the distinguished members of the Chicago school, putting Erving Goffman, then a fellow graduate student of mine, in his place with the literature gambit. It was just what we all feared. Believing Wirth had not given sufficiently serious attention to some influential ideas about operationalism, Goffman challenged him in class with quotations from Percy Bridgeman"s book on the subject. Wirth smiled and asked sadistically, "Which edition is that, Mr. Goffman?" Maybe there was an important difference between editions, though none of us believed that. We thought, instead, that we"d better be careful about the literature or They Could Get You. "They" included not only teachers but peers, who might welcome an opportunity to show how well they knew the literature at your expenses. ——Excerpts of Chapter 8 "Terrorized by the Literature", from Writing for Social Scientists: How to Start and Finish Your Thesis, Book, or Article

问答题扫黄打非

问答题bull market

问答题中国坚定不移地走和平发展道路。中国立足于自身发展，不搞侵略扩张，不搞以邻为壑，更不会走“国强必霸”的传统大国崛起的老路，而是真诚希望与世界各国和平共处，共同发展。我们不追求自己的利益最大化，而将认真实行互利共赢的开放战略。我们将继续为发展中国家提供力所能及的帮助，在平等互利的基础上与发达国家发展合作。当前，西方国家遇到一些困难，我们没有落井下石，而是尽可能提供支持。为什么?在全球化的时代，帮助别人就是帮助自己，合作是我们的唯一选择。

问答题汽车单双号限行

问答题Passage Two NATIONS, like people, occasionally get the blues; and right now the United States, normally the world's most self-confident place, is glum. Eight out of ten Americans think their country is heading in the wrong direction. The hapless George Bush is partly to blame for this: his approval ratings are now sub-Nixonian. But many are concerned not so much about a failed president as about a failing nation. One source of angst is the sorry state of American capitalism ( see article). The" Washington consensus" told the world that open markets and deregulation would solve its problems. Yet American house prices are falling faster than during the Depression, petrol is more expensive than in the 1970s, banks are collapsing, the euro is kicking sand in the dollar's face, credit is scarce, recession and inflation both threaten the economy, consumer confidence is an oxymoron and Belgians have just bought Budweiser, "America's beer". And it's not just the downturn that has caused this discontent. Many Americans feel as if they missed the boom. Between 2002 and 2006 the incomes of 99% rose by an average of 1% a year in real terms, while those of the top 1% rose by 11% a year; three-quarters of the economic gains during Mr Bush's presidency went to that top 1%. Economic envy, once seen as a European vice, is now rife. The rich appear in Barack Obama's speeches not as entrepreneurial role models but as modern versions of the "malefactors of great wealth" denounced by Teddy Roosevelt a century ago: this lot, rather than building trusts, avoid taxes and ship jobs to Mexico. Globalisation is under fire: free trade is less popular in the United States than in any other developed country, and a nation built on immigrants is building a fence to keep them out. People mutter about nation-building beginning at home: why, many wonder, should American children do worse at reading than Polish ones and at maths than Lithuanians? Abroad, America has spent vast amounts of blood and treasure, to little purpose. In Iraq, finding an acceptable exit will look like success; Afghanistan is slipping. America's claim to be a beacon of freedom in a dark world has been dimmed by Guant Namo, Abu Ghraib and the flouting of the Geneva Conventions amid the panicky "unipolar" posturing in the aftermath of September 11th. Now the world seems very multipolar. Europeans no longer worry about American ascendancy. The French, some say, understood the Arab world rather better than the neoconservatives did. Russia, the Gulf Arabs and the rising powers of Asia scoff openly at the Washington consensus. China in particular spooks America and may do so even more over the next few weeks of Olympic medal-gathering. Americans are discussing the rise of China and their consequent relative decline; measuring when China's economy will be bigger and counting its missiles and submarines has become a popular pastime in Washington. A few years ago, no politician would have been seen with a book called "The Post-American World". Mr Obama has been conspicuously reading Fareed Zakaria's recent volume. America has got into funks before now. In the 1950s it went into a Sputnik-driven spin about Soviet power; in the 1970s there was Watergate, Vietnam and the oil shocks; in the late 1980s Japan seemed to be buying up America. Each time, the United States rebounded, because the country is good at fixing itself. Just as American capitalism allows companies to die, and to be created quickly, so its political system reacts fast. In Europe, political leaders emerge slowly, through party hierarchies; in America, the primaries permit inspirational unknowns to burst into the public consciousness from nowhere. Still, countries, like people, behave dangerously when their mood turns dark. If America fails to distinguish between what it needs to change and what it needs to accept, it risks hurting not just allies and trading partners, but also itself:

问答题UN Security Council

问答题世界遗产名录

问答题the United States Senate

问答题联络口译

问答题odd number

问答题单亲家庭

问答题community-level democracy

问答题《十面埋伏》(古曲)

问答题MT