If you have ever wondered just how hard it is for kids from broken neighborhoods to avoid prison, a glance at data compiled by the Justice Mapping Center gives an easy answer: it's even harder than you might think. While crime is up around the nation and spread out across cities in a broad pattern, the majority of people convicted of crimes come from very few and very concentrated neighborhoods, according to the center, a Brooklyn-based research group that tracks the declared residency of convicts. More than 50% of adult male inmates from New York City come from just 14 districts in Manhattan, the Bronx and Brooklyn (with the most, about 12%, coming from East and Central Harlem) even though men in those 14 areas make up just 17% of the city's total population. Similar patterns can be seen in places like Phoenix—where one community, South Mountain, is home to 1% of Arizona's total population but 6.5% of the state's inmates—and Austin, Texas, where one section has 19% of the city's population but 27% of those on probation. Why does this matter? Because, say Eric Cadora and Charles Swartz, who run the Justice Mapping Center, if you can pinpoint the few-block area that produces the most criminals, you can create programs that specifically target the problems of the people who live there and help them avoid the behaviors that land them in jail. That, in return, could save millions of dollars. New York State spends $42,000 an inmate a year. Multiply that by the number of prisoners who grew up on the same streets in parts of Harlem, the Bronx and Brooklyn, and you get what Cadora calls "million-dollar blocks" because that's what it costs the state to keep criminals from those areas behind bars. It's hard to argue that this money couldn't be better spent. "If you had ... this block and that million dollars, would you do the same thing?" asks Cadora. Some communities are saying no. Framing the debate as one of economics rather than simply social justice can provide political cover for officials to try out innovative alternatives to traditional incarceration. In the vanguard of this movement was the juvenile-justice department of Deschutes County, Ore., which about 10 years ago made a deal with the state: if Deschutes reduced the number of juveniles it sent to state-run detention centers, Oregon would give back to the county the money that it had been spending to incarcerate those Deschutes kids. By giving up 16 out of 26 beds for young offenders at the state facility, Deschutes recouped nearly $4 million over seven years and put that money toward what it called the Community Youth Investment Program. The county assigned social workers to provide guidance and parenting skills in homes with newborns who had at least one parent on probation or parole. It began screening kindergartners for antisocial tendencies; those most at risk were singled out for special attention. Of course, teens continued to assault people and steal cars. But instead of going to the state-run jail, those caught and convicted had to make various community-building reparations like apologizing to the victim, paying restitution and participating in service projects or apprenticeships. In seven years the county's youth-incarceration rate dropped 25%, and the number of teens who received citations or were arrested for crimes went down 28%. According to Bob La Combe, who runs the county's juvenile system, young people are "making the connection between the crime they committed and the harm to the community." The state, however, may take more convincing. Because of budget cuts, Oregon stopped funding the program in 2003. The community-based justice initiative is now paid for by Deschutes, but money for some of the preventive measures is likely to run out this summer. Funding will probably always be a problem for these kinds of projects. But even some conservatives are realizing that being tough on crime for the past three decades hasn't reduced the disproportionate number of criminals coming from certain areas. The Department of Justice now backs about 300 Weed and Seed programs nationwide, some in areas as small as a few square blocks. Police, prosecutors and neighborhood-watch groups collaborate to weed out the drug dealers and other undesirables, while public and private social-service providers seed the area with wholesome extracurricular activities, new community centers, job counseling and beautification projects that offer residents an alternative way of life. "Criminal justice isn't what makes people behave," Cadora says. "You strengthen the institutions so people have a stake in things."

{{B}}Task 2 Passage TranslationDirections: In this part of the test, you will hear 2 English passages. You will hear the passages ONLY ONCE. After you have heard each passage, translate it into Chinese and write your version in the corresponding space in your ANSWER BOOKLET. You may take notes while you are listening.{{/B}}

Can you spot a good marriage? I was pretty sure I could, starting with my own. My husband and I rarely argued, we had similar careers, and we shared common interests. So nobody was more surprised than we were when our 17-year marriage ended in divorce. It turns out I had been judging my marriage by the wrong standards-as most of us do. In one famous study, researchers asked therapists, married couples, and others to watch videotaped conversations of ten couples and try to identify the relationships that had broken up. Even the therapists guessed wrong half the time. Luckily, scientists have identified some simple but powerful indicators that can help you recognize marital strife long before your relationship hits the skids. For instance, a couple go hiking on their first date. They marry, and years later, the wife tells this story: "We got terribly lost that day. It took us hours to find our way back, but we laughed about how neither of us had a good sense of direction. After that, we knew not to plan another hiking trip!" Another wife might tell it a different way: "He lost the map, and it took hours to find our way back. After that, I never wanted to go hiking again. " The keeper marriage? The one in which the positive is accentuated and the problems laughed off. Research shows that it's not what you say but how you say it: Your emphasis will correctly predict the success or failure of your marriage about 90 percent of the time. To size up your relationship, ask yourself these questions. Do you: Avoid arguments? Studies show it's a mistake to judge a relationship by the amount of time you argue, especially early on. When I was first married, I felt lucky that my husband and I rarely fought. A University of Washington study of newly wed couples appeared to confirm my belief: It showed that couples who argued relatively little were happier than combative ones. When the same couples were checked three years later, however, those with an early history of bickering were more likely to have found stability in their marriages, whereas couples who prided themselves on their equanimity were in troubled relationships or already divorced. Of course, violence or verbal abuse is never acceptable. Roll your eyes? This seemingly harmless gesture is a clear sign of marital discord. The same researchers at the University of Washington found that eye rolling, even when accompanied by a laugh or smile, indicates some degree of contempt—poison to a relationship. "This kind of sarcastic gesture doesn't clearly state an objection, which makes it difficult for the other person to respond," says Janice Kiecolt-Glaser at the Ohio State University College of Medicine. "The obvious first step is to stop the behavior. But the second is to explore the reasons behind it. " Duck decisions? I often deferred to my husband when it came to making weekend or vacation plans. Later I realized our social life didn't reflect my favourite activities—a relationship red flag. Psychologist Howard Markman, a professor at the University of Denver, agrees. It's risky for your relationship when one of you controls the social agenda, he says.

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{{B}}SECTION 1 LISTENING TEST{{/B}}

Around the world, rumbles of complaint about globalization are growing louder—and these rumbles are not confined to activist movements. In East Asia, the financial crisis of 1997 left a jaundiced sense of what globalization entails, though robust economic recovery has tempered that. Globalization's standing has also been badly damaged in Latin America by the meltdown of the Argentine economy in 2000 and financial crises in Brazil in 1999 and 2001. New fears about globalization are surfacing in Europe, too. In Poland these have taken the form of concern about foreign capital taking over the Polish banking system; takeover fears also permeate France and Italy. In France and Germany, working people link globalization with pressures to dismantle the social democratic state. Among Americans, outsourcing of service-sector jobs has become a leading concern. Opposition to free trade has crept up the income and social-strata ladder to include educated white-collar workers. This new opposition comes on top of existing resentments among blue-collar workers at the loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs. These developments have raised concerns about the durability of globalization even among its supporters. In the final section of his new book Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the 20th Century, the Harvard professor Jeffiy Frieden—who is in favor of globalization—ruminates on the possibility that today's globalization, like that of the 19th century, might falter. It can be highly instructive to look back at what some historians call the first globalization. When people do so, however, they often tend to identify its end as the beginning of World War I in 1914. This is wrong, and leads to misunderstandings about today's globalization. The first globalization ended with the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression. The world's response to the crash, however, was profoundly affected by the political conditions that World War I had created. In the United States, Britain and France, the war created political and social conditions that fostered a turn to social democracy. In Germany, the onerous economic burdens of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles fostered a turn to Nazism. This history has enormous significance for understanding today's predicament. The first lesson is that the economic crisis of 1929—not politics—brought down the first globalization, suggesting that an economic crisis, and not politics, will bring down today's globalization.The second lesson is that while political developments before 1929 did not cause the crash, they mattered enormously for the international response. After World War I, governments substantially recreated the prewar economic system, but the reconstructed system distributed prosperity extremely unevenly. In the United States, wealth and income inequality grew during the "Roaring Twenties". In Britain, the industrial midlands and the north suffered from persistent stagnation because of an overvalued exchange rate. And prosperity simply bypassed Germany. Additionally, there was a popular turn to isolationism in response to the carnage wrought by the war. The global economic system was therefore unpopular, and consequently it had few defenders when the crash came. That lesson holds for the current globalization, which is also unpopular and feared. After the first globalization crashed because of inherent financial fragility, the ensuing New Deal era created a system that remedied that fragility by restricting private ownership of bullion, and creating deposit insurance and lenders of last resort. The New Deal era also created a social democratic, mass-consumption economy in which income was more broadly shared because of unionization, minimum wages and social security provisions. But such an economy is expensive for individual capitalists, giving them an incentive to evade its costs. That has been a driving force behind globalization since 1980, and that is the contradiction in today's system. Business has an incentive to move to countries with lower costs—yet it still needs mass consumption. Today's global economic system needs a solid middle class, but is also driven to hollow out that middle class. This contradiction has been papered over by consumer-borrowing provided by deregulated financial markets and a 25-year asset price boom. The problem is that such borrowing risks prove unsustainable if incomes are hollowed out, and that could stop the economic merry-go-round. If that stoppage produces an economic crash, globalization may crash, too. Globalization will lack political support, after being a primary cause of a hollowed-out middle class. The pattern of retreat is difficult to predict. One possibility is a return to a world of tariffs and quotas. A second response may be the emergence of regional trade and investment blocs. A third response that would preserve globalization would be the establishment of new domestic and international rules that support a social democratic, mass-consumption economy. All three scenarios challenge the international economic system that is supported by today's global elites.

Talk about fanciful thinking. One might as well ask if there will be a war that will end all wars, or a pill that will make us all good-looking. It is also a perfectly understandable question, given that half a million Americans will die this year of a disorder that is often discussed in terms that make it seem less like a disease than an unconquerable enemy. What tuberculosis was to the 19th century, cancer is to the 20th: an malevolent force that frightens people beyond all reason far more than, say, diabetes or high blood pressure. The welcome boom in cancer drugs owes its beginning to one of the 20th century's greatest scientific insights: that cancer is caused not by depression or deteriorating environment or sexual repression, but by faulty genes. Every tumor begins with just one errant cell that has been unlucky enough to suffer at least two, but sometimes several, genetic mutations. Those mutations cause the cell to replicate wildly, allowing it to escape the control that genes normally maintain over the growth of new tissue. This realization has transformed cancer, in little more than a decade, from an utterly mysterious disease into a disorder whose molecular machinery is largely understood. This new view has sparked innovations that will manage the process and keep it from killing large numbers of people.

When young college graduates decide where to move, they are not just looking at the usual suspects, like New York, Washington and San Francisco. Other cities are increasing their share of these valuable residents at an even higher rate and have reached a high overall percentage, led by Denver, San Diego, Nashville, Salt Lake City and Portland, Ore. , according to a report published Monday by City Observatory, a new think tank. And as young people continue to spurn the suburbs for urban living, more of them are moving to the very heart of cities. The number of college-educated people age 25 to 34 living within three miles of city centers has surged, up 37 % since 2000. Some cities are attracting young talent while their overall population falls, like Pittsburgh and New Orleans. And in a reversal, others that used to be magnets, like Atlanta and Charlotte, are struggling to attract them at the same rate. Even as Americans over all have become less likely to move, young, college educated people continue to move at a high clip—about a million cross state lines each year. Where they end up provides a map of the cities that have a chance to be the economic powerhouses of the future. "There is a very strong track record of places that attract talent becoming places of long-term success," said economist Edward Glaeser, "The most successful economic development policy is to attract and retain smart people and then get out of their way. " The economic effects reach beyond the work the young people do, according to economist Enrico Moretti, For every college graduate who takes a job in an innovation industry, he found, five additional jobs are eventually created in that city. "It's a type of growth that feeds on itself—the more young workers you have, the more companies are interested in locating their operations in that area and the more young people are going to move there," he said. About 25% more young college graduates live in major metropolitan areas today than in 2000, which is double the percentage increase in cities' total population. All the 51 biggest metros except Detroit have gained young talent, either from net migration to the cities or from residents graduating from college. It is based on data from the American Community Survey and written by Joe Cortright, an economisl who runs City Observatory and Impresa, a consulting firm on regional economies. Denver has become one of the most powerful magnets. Its population of the young and educated is up 47% since 2000, nearly double the percentage increase in the New York metro area. And 7. 5% of Denver's population is in this group, more than the national average of 5. 2%. Denver has many of the tangible things young people want, economists say, including mountains, sunshine and jobs in booming industries like tech. Perhaps more important, it also has the ones that give cities the perception of cultural cool. "With lots of cultural things to do and getting away to the mountains, you can have the work-play balance more than any place I've ever lived," said Colleen Douglass, 27, a video producer at a start-up Craftsy. "There's this really thriving start-up scene here, and the sense we can be in a place we love and work at a cool new company. " Other cities that have had significant increases in a young and educated population and that now have more than their share include San Diego, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, Nashville, Salt Lake City and Portland, Ore. At the other end of the spectrum are the cities where less than 4% of the population are young college graduates. Among those, Detroit lost about 10% of this group, while Providence gained just 6% and Memphis 10%. Atlanta, one of the biggest net gainers of young graduates in the 1990s, has taken a sharp turn. Its young, educated population has increased just 2. 8% since 2000, significantly less than its overall population. It is suffering the consequences of overenthusiasm for new houses and new jobs before the crash, economists say. The effects of the migration of the young are most vividly seen in urban cores. In 1980, young adults were 10% more likely than other people to live in these areas, according to the report from City Observatory, which is sponsored by the Knight Foundation. In 2010, they were 51% more likely, and those with college degrees were 126% more likely. The trend extends to all the largest metropolitan areas except Detroit and Birmingham. Of the most populous metropolitan areas, Washington and Philadelphia showed the largest increases of young adults living there, at 75 and 78%. Washington also had the largest share of young college graduates over all, at 8. 1%. "They want somelhing exciting, culturally fun, involving a lot of diversity—and their fathers' suburban lifestyle doesn't seem to be all that thrilling," Mr. Glaeser said. How many eventually desert the city centers as they age remains to be seen, but demographers predict that many will stay. They say that could bolster city economies, lead to decreases in crime and improvements in public schools. If the trends continue, places like Pittsburgh and Buffalo could develop a new reputation— as role models for resurgence.

{{B}}Passage TranslationDirections: In this part of the test, you will hear 2 passages in English. You will hear the passages ONLY ONCE. After you have heard each passage, translate it into Chinese and write your version in the corresponding space in your ANSWER BOOKLET. You may take notes while you are listening.{{/B}}

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{{B}}Part B Listening and TranslationTask 1 Sentence TranslationDirections: In this part of the test, you will hear 5 English sentences. You will hear the sentences ONLY ONCE. After you have heard each sentence, translate it into Chinese and write your version in the corresponding space in your ANSWER BOOKLET.{{/B}}

BSECTION 3: TRANSLATION TEST(1)Directions: Translate the following passage into Chinese and write your version in the corresponding space in your ANSWER BOOKLET./B

{{B}}Part B Listening ComprehensionDirections: In this part of the test there will be some short talks and conversations. After each one, you will be asked some questions. The talks, conversations and questions will be spoken ONLY ONCE. Now listen carefully and choose the right answer to each question you have heard and write the letter of the answer you have chosen in the corresponding space in your ANSWER BOOKLET.{{/B}}

The English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge said that watching Edmund Kean, the great tragedian of the London stage 200 years ago, was like "reading Shakespeare by flashes of lightning". That's how we like our great moments in history to be, surrounded by drama, attended by heroes. By those standards, the process that led to the signing of the Treaty of Rome 50 years ago was almost ineffably mundane—a series of long meetings of forgotten bureaucrats in rooms foul with tobacco smoke. No blood was shed, few memorable speeches made; the heroes were those who could cajole a compromise into being over a hurried coffee, or draft a clause with exactly the right kind of nice phrase that would win broad support. Yet the founding of the European Economic Community in 1957 was a momentous event. Today's Europe is the largest expanse of peace and widely shared prosperity in the world. It is perfectly true that the EEC—as it was called in 1957, the European Union as it is now—is not solely responsible for that happy outcome. After the carnage of World War II, it was as much American minds and muscle as European ones that determined that Europe needed new institutions binding nations together if it was to avoid the catastrophes of war. Indeed, NATO and the Marshall Plan, both hatched in Washington, predated the EEC's precursor, the European Coal and Steel Community. Yet for all that, the decision in 1957 by six nations to pool sovereignty in multinational institutions marked a decisive break with the past. As it became apparent that the EEC worked—that common markets provided the sort of stability in which economies can grow—so its appeal spread. Soon, everyone with a claim to be European wanted to join. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the time was ripe for a dramatic expansion of the EU to the east, and gradually, that happened. The EU now has 27 members, including three former Soviet republics. The EU has spawned admirers—how could it not?—but not imitators. No other multinational grouping—not Mercosur in Latin America, not ASEAN in Southeast Asia—has anything like the powerful institutions of the Union. Europe's history and geography, it turns out, are unique. Its nations are small enough and close enough to understand each other and have shared values; but at the same time, all of Europe lived through such horrors in the 20th century that its nations' postwar leaders needed little convincing of the virtues of cooperation. In Europe, nationalism has a bad name; in much of the rest of the world, where the memory of colonialism is still fresh, it is a source of pride and identity. Though Americans were midwives to the EU's birth—Dean Acheson, the postwar US Secretary of State, thought that Britain had made a historic error by failing to join the coal and steel community—they have often since been bemused by Europe's lack of nationalistic assertiveness. As Roger Cohen wrote in the International Herald Tribune recently, "The quiet glory of the postnational, postmodern entity is not the glory of the young, vigorous, flag-waving America." True, that judgment would have been harder to make in the early 1990s. Then, Jacques Delors was the President of the European Commission, the single currency was being planned, and Francois Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl were shaping European policy. It seemed certain that political union would follow the economic variety and the EU become a second democratic Atlantic superpower. But that dream was curdled by European dithering in the Balkan wars and by the concomitant realization that European electorates had no stomach for displays of superpowerdom as they have been conventionally measured: that is to say, in killing capability. In 2005, voters in France and the Netherlands—two founding members—rejected a draft European constitution, without which political union is impossible. Javier Solana, the EU's estimable foreign affairs czar, may bustle around the Middle East as he has been doing of late, but nobody pretends that when he does so he carries the weight of the US Secretary of State. But perhaps the old measures of power and influence are not adequate to our time. After all, the horrors of Iraq are loud testimony to the limitations of hard power, applied by men bearing arms. The nations and people of the EU are generous when it comes to aiding the poor and disadvantaged; sensible in forming policies that address pressing environmental challenges. And perhaps above all—as the next four pages show—the institutions that give shape to Europe's growing unity have made life better for those who live there. That seems a timid, small success. But for anyone old enough to remember the European misery out of which the Treaty of Rome took shape, it is a stunning miracle.

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作为一个中国人，经书不可不读。我年过三十才知道读书自修的重要。我披阅、我圈点，但是恒心不足，时作时辍。“五十以学易，可以无大过矣”，我如今年过八十，还没有接触过易经，说来惭愧。史书也很重要。我出国留学的时候，我父亲买了一套同文石印的前四史，塞满了我的行箧的一半空间。我在国外混了几年之后又把前四史原封带回来了，直到四十年后才鼓起勇气读了《通鉴》一遍。现在我要读的书太多，深感时间有限。我的好多时间都糊里糊涂地混过去了，“少壮不努力，老大徒伤悲。”

The cars, SUVs and pickups people will buy in the years ahead are likely to use less fuel, and many will rely on ethanol or household electricity instead of gasoline. The energy legislation pushed through the Senate this week provides a roadmap to the future, demanding higher automobile fuel economy, mandating huge increases in ethanol as a motor fuel and supporting more research into building "plug-in" hybrid-electric vehicles. While Senate Republicans complained that the bill does nothing to increase domestic oil production, Democrats said that's because the nation must move energy policy away from its heavy reliance on oil. The House is preparing its own version. The Senate bill requires automakers to increase fuel economy to 35 miles per gallon, about a 40 percent increase over what cars, SUVs and small trucks are required to achieve now. It would lump all the vehicles under a single regulation, but also give manufacturers flexibility so large SUVs wouldn't have to meet the same requirements as smaller cars. It requires a yearly increase of ethanol production to 36 billion gallons a year by 2022, a sevenfold increase from today. By 2015 half of the new vehicles offered to buyers—as many as 10 million—will have to be capable of running on 85 percent ethanol, biodiesel or some other alternative energy source. And for the first time, the president must find ways to cut oil demand by 20 percent of what it is expected to be in 2017—a target President Bush has embraced—and attain further reductions after that. Gasoline demand is expected to grow 13 percent to 261 billion gallons a year by 2017 without some fuel saving measures. But will auto showrooms provide the same selection of vehicles? Will they be as big, as powerful, as safe? "I would expect them to look a lot like they do today, the same size, the same acceleration and the same or even better safety," says David Friedman, director of the clean vehicles program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. He maintains they will have better technology, better engines, more efficient transmissions and stronger aluminum bodies. They'll cost a little more but use much less gasoline. "The goal is to replace fossil fuels with alternative fuels and use conservation," said Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., who was involved in the discussions on many of the auto fuel economy and motor fuel issues that ended up in the bill. What has changed from a few years ago, she said, is there no longer is "a fear factor that you're going to be in itty bitty cars" if the government requires automakers to make more fuel efficient vehicles. In addition to making conventional cars more fuel efficient, the bill seeks to boost research into use of lithium ion batteries— like those used in laptop computers and cameras—in vehicles. Should ways be found to make them more durable in a vehicle environment, cars could be plugged into an electric socket at home, relying only rarely on gasoline, says Friedman. Some studies have estimated the fuel cost—mostly the cost of electricity and a small amount of gasoline—would be equivalent to about $1 a gallon, said Cantwell. Automakers, lobbying hard against the fuel economy provision in the Senate bill, expressed continued concern Friday about their ability to meet the new requirements without changing the mix of cars they will be able to provide in the showrooms of 2020. "There's no way you can get those numbers without a dramatic shift in consumer choice," insisted Mark LaNeve, General Motors' vice president of North America sales, service and marketing. "We don't know how it's attainable." Eric Ridenour, chief operating officer at Chrysler Group, where three of every four vehicles are built on truck frames, said the company will have to decide whether to keep selling some of its larger vehicles. "Clearly the larger family-sized vehicles will be the ones that will be most at risk," said Ridenour. "The end result will be lighter, smaller vehicles in general." He envisioned generally smaller cars and more of them running on diesel. Ford Motor Co. is committed to increasing auto fuel economy, said Alan Mulally, the company's chief executive. "It's what customers want. It's what they value." But is it possible technically to meet the proposed 35 mpg fleet requirements even with a new way of calculating compliance taking into account vehicles size? "That's the only debate," said Mulally on Friday at a Ford assembly plant in Chicago where the company was introducing its new Taurus model, one that travels 28 mpg on the open road.

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Passage 1