摘要
目前的地方政府运作逐渐表现出"矫枉过正"的倾向,反映了组织控制有效性的悖论。本文基于多位点的案例研究,提炼出地方政府"矫枉过正"的若干表现,并从组织控制的角度分析了"矫枉过正"的形成机理。基于组织控制视角下"激励—成本—沟通"的分析框架,"矫枉过正"的形成机理可以从激励结构失衡、规避治理成本与组织沟通失效三个方面加以解释:结果导向的问责制度诱导了地方政府执行过程中为了结果而"不择手段"的工作方式;地方政府为规避组织中的监管成本以及协调成本而放弃政策"留口",并采取统一的政策标准;下级同上级沟通中,上级的无效回应又强化了"矫枉过正"的行为。
A tendency of“overcorrection”has occurred in the operation of China’s local government,which is a sort of the paradox of organizational control.This paper summarizes various features of“overcorrection”based on the multisite case studies and analyzes the forming mechanism by the framework of organizational analysis.This phenomenon can be explained in three facets,which are unbalanced incentive structure,reductive governance cost,and failing organizational communication.In detailed:(1)the system of accountability,which is consequence-orientation,induces the local government to adopt an ultimate work style featuring in“the end justifies the means”;(2)ambiguity in the policy leads to the local government to increase the pressure from layer to layer,which aims to reduce governance costs and(3)in the communication between the lower to higher,the ineffective response from higher authorities enhances the“overcorrection”.
出处
《中国公共政策评论》
2021年第2期76-93,共18页
Chinese Public Policy Review
基金
国家社科基金青年项目“中德地方环境治理模式比较研究”(编号:18CZZ010)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
地方政府
政府行为
组织控制
组织分析
“矫枉过正”
Local Government
Governmental Behavior
Organizational Control
Organizational Analysis
“Overcorrection”
