摘要
将党建工作纳入公司章程有利于保障党组织在公司治理结构中的法定地位,从而提高公司的政治治理能力。通过手工收集"党建入章"上市公司的数据,以2013—2018年A股上市公司为样本,运用双重差分法,研究"党建入章"实施对企业成本管理的影响。研究发现将党建工作纳入公司章程后,企业营业总成本粘性水平显著降低,且这一变动是通过缓解代理问题实现的,表明党组织治理有利于优化管理层的资源配置决策,提高成本管理效率。进一步研究发现,"党建入章"对成本粘性的抑制作用受到企业股权结构的影响,在企业股权较分散、股权制衡度较低以及管理层持股较低的情形下更显著。研究结果为"党建入章"这一政策的实施提供了较为严谨的科学证据,丰富了成本粘性的影响因素研究和中国特色的公司治理理论,为党组织参与公司治理有效路径探索提供更多经验支持。
Adding Party building provisions in corporate articles is conducive to safeguarding the statutory status of Party organizations in the corporate governance structure.And it can help to improve enterprises’ability of political governance.After implementing this practice,the internal management and decision-making of enterprises might be deeply influenced by Party organizations,and thus the cost control level might be changed.This paper focuses on the impact of this practice on cost stickiness and analyzes its functional mechanism.Cost stickiness refers to the asymmetric cost change in response to sales change,and it reflects the tendency of enterprises to hold on to resources in the downturns.Based on a research sample of A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2018,we apply the difference-indifferences approach to examine the effect of adding Party building provisions in corporate articles on cost stickiness.We manually collect data on listed companies that have implemented this practice.The results show that the stickiness level of enterprise total operating cost is significantly reduced after implementing the practice,and this change is achieved by mitigating the dual agency problems.As the statutory status of Party organizations is established,Party organizations in enterprises have more motivation and ability to participate in the operation and management of enterprises.Thus,managers are subject to greater scrutiny by Party organizations.In this case,managers will constrain their opportunistic behaviors,leading to lower cost stickiness.In addition,Party organizations help to protect the interest of minority shareholders.The increasing difficulty of resource extraction of majority shareholders leads to a reduction in expropriation behaviors such as asset occupation,which in turn lessens enterprise cost stickiness.The participation of Party organizations in corporate governance also means that they guide shareholders and management to make decisions in line with the spirit of the Party by means of cultural publicity and spirit guidance,so as to reduce self-interested behaviors that are contrary to the spirit of the Party,thus alleviating the dual agency problem of enterprises.The findings indicate that Party organization governance contributes to optimizing the resource allocation decision of managers and improving the efficiency of cost management.Further research finds that the relationship between the practice and cost stickiness is moderated by the ownership structure of enterprises,and it is more significant in the case of more dispersed ownership structure,lower ownership constraints,and lower management shareholding.Mediation mechanism tests show that adding Party building provisions in corporate articles can indeed reduce cost stickiness by alleviating the dual agency problems.The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in two aspects:First,this paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of cost stickiness by documenting a new way of corporate governance.Through combining Party building and cost stickiness,the study examines the impact of political governance on cost stickiness.The findings expand the channel of enterprise cost management.Second,different from the existing research methods,this paper uses the difference-in-differences approach to examine the dynamic changes of cost stickiness before and after the Party building reform.It provides relatively rigorous scientific evidence for the implementation of adding Party building provisions in corporate articles,and provides guidance for Chinese listed companies to properly and effectively embed the Party organization into the corporate governance structure.
作者
李继元
汪方军
赵红升
舒伟
Li Jiyuan;Wang Fangjun;Zhao Hongsheng;Shu Wei(School of Management,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710049,China;School of Business,Xi’an University of Finance and Economics,Xi’an 710100,China)
出处
《外国经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第10期21-34,共14页
Foreign Economics & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71972152)
陕西省教育厅哲学社会科学重点基地研究项目(20JZ053)
关键词
党建工作
公司章程
成本粘性
代理问题
股权结构
Party building
corporate articles
cost stickiness
agency problems
ownership structure
