摘要
近年来,在债券违约频发的背景下,公司债券契约条款作为平衡债券投资者和发行方利益的机制引发了监管机构和投资者的广泛关注,如何设置合理有效的债券契约条款成为聚焦的热点话题。本文基于信息不对称和代理理论,考察了内部控制质量是否影响公司债券契约条款的设置。研究发现,高质量的内部控制通过改善公司的信息环境、降低代理成本等机制,显著减少了债券契约条款的设置,这种影响在承销商声誉较低时较为明显。进一步研究发现,由于高质量的内部控制在公司自身层面能缓解股东和债券投资者之间的信息不对称和代理问题,通过债券契约条款的增信措施对债券发行定价的影响较为有限。本文的研究结论为更好理解公司基本面特征如何影响债券契约条款的设置以及内部控制的经济后果提供了新的经验证据。
In recent years,under the background of frequent bond defaults,restrictive covenants,as a mechanism to balance the interests of bond investors and issuers,has attracted extensive attention of regulatory authorities and investors.How to set reasonable and effective contract terms has become a hot topic in the financial circles.Based on information asymmetry and agency theory,this paper examines whether the quality of internal control affects the setting of bond covenants.It is found that high-quality internal control significantly reduces the setting of bond covenants,and high-profile underwriters weaken the negative relationship between internal control quality and bond covenants.Further research found that internal control can weaken the role of contract terms in reducing the financing cost,indicating that high-quality internal control can reduce the information asymmetry and agency risk faced by bond investors at the company's own level,and reduce the setting of bond contract terms.The research conclusion provides new empirical evidence for a better understanding of how corporate fundamental characteristics affect the setting of bond contract terms and the economic consequences of internal control.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第6期150-166,共17页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772011,72072007)
国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL101)的资助
关键词
内部控制
债券契约条款
承销商声誉
Internal Control
Bond Covenants
Profile of Underwriters
