摘要
本文考察员工持股计划(ESOP)股东表决权的不同实现方式对企业创新的异质性影响。通过剖析ESOP实施方案,本文识别并定义了“员工激励主导型”和“控制权加强主导型”两类管理模式。实证结果表明在同时赋予入股员工收益分享权和投票表决权的“员工激励主导型”管理模式下,ESOP显著提高了企业创新能力;而“控制权加强主导型”管理模式不仅未能使ESOP成为可置信承诺,反而相对巩固了大股东在股东大会的话语权,使ESOP成为其潜在加强公司控制的工具。本文揭示了上市公司实施ESOP的复杂动机,打开ESOP管理模式的黑箱,为科学设计ESOP及保障入股员工合法权益带来积极的启发和思考。
This paper examines the heterogeneous impacts of different ways to realize employee shareholders'voting rights on firms’innovation.By analyzing details of ESOPs,the paper defines two kinds of ESOP management modes,“dominance of employee incentive”and“dominance of strengthening control right”.Results show that only ESOPs with“dominance of employee incentive”management mode can improve firms’innovation.However,the“dominance of strengthening control right”management mode turns out to be ineffective and becomes a tool for major shareholders to strengthen their control right.This paper reveals the complex motivations of launching ESOP,open the box of ESOP management mode and brings inspiration for the scientific design of ESOP and the protection of employee shareholders.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第4期144-157,共14页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72172150)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(72302160、72302163)
首都经济贸易大学新入职青年教师科研启动基金项目(XRZ2023047)的资助
