摘要
文章在企业组织理论与资本结构理论相融合的统一分析框架下,考察了集团控制对上市子公司过度负债的影响。研究发现:相比独立上市公司,集团控制上市公司过度负债的可能性更高。区分产权性质后发现,相比非国有企业集团控制的上市公司,国有企业集团控制的上市公司出现过度负债的可能性更低。进一步研究表明,良好的公司治理、外部制度环境的完善以及高质量审计能够对企业过度负债行为发挥显著地治理效应。文章为理解我国企业过度负债现象的成因提供了新视角,同时也为政府部门"去杠杆"政策的落实提供了经验证据。
This study investigates the effect of group control on the excess leverage of Chinese listed firms during 2003-2016.We find that the extent and probability of excess leverage in group-affiliated firms are significantly higher than stand-alone firms.After considering the firm ownership,we find that the excess leverage is more pronounced among private group-affiliations than the state-owned ones.Moreover,the empirical evidence indicates that better corporate governance and efficient institutional environment can effectively decrease the degree of excess leverage in group-affiliated firms.This paper provides a new perspective for understanding the over-leverage problem of Chinese firms and offers practical implications for the implementation of de-leverage policy.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期76-87,共12页
Accounting Research
基金
上海社科青年项目(2019EGL016)的资助
关键词
集团控制
产权性质
过度负债
Group Control
Ownership Type
Excess Leverage
