摘要
近年来,并购交易引发的商誉泡沫现象已成为我国A股市场的重大风险要素之一,引起了各界的广泛关注。本文以2007—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从公司信息披露违规的角度切入,探究超额商誉引发的负面效应。研究发现,超额商誉规模越大,上市公司的信息披露违规倾向和频率越高;机制检验表明,经营风险、代理成本和融资约束是超额商誉触发信息披露违规的传导路径;针对治理对策的进一步研究发现,在独立董事规模较小、非经四大会计师事务所审计的情形下,超额商誉触发信息披露违规的现象更明显;异质性分析发现,超额商誉触发信息披露违规的现象在民营企业以及市场化程度较高的地区更为明显。本文结论丰富了商誉以及企业违规领域的研究,对监管机构、投资者以及上市公司正确认识超额商誉的经济后果具有启示意义。
In recent years,the phenomenon of goodwill bubbles caused by mergers and acquisitions has become one of the major risk factors in China’s A-share market,which has attracted widespread attention from all walks of life.Using the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as samples,this paper explores the negative effects that may be caused by excess goodwill from the perspective of information disclosure violations among listed companies.It is found that the larger the scale of excess goodwill,the greater the probability and frequency of information disclosure violations.The mechanism test shows that operating risks,agency costs and financing constraints are the conduction paths.It is also found that when the scale of independent directors is small and audited by non-Big Four accounting firms,the phenomenon of excessive goodwill triggering information disclosure violations is more obvious.Further research finds that the phenomenon of excessive goodwill triggering information disclosure violations is more significant in private enterprises and areas with a high degree of marketization.The conclusions of this paper enrich the research in the field of goodwill and corporate violations,enlightening significance for regulators,investors and listed companies to correctly understand the economic consequences of excess goodwill.
出处
《金融监管研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第8期22-39,共18页
Financial Regulation Research
基金
教育部人文社科基金规划项目“双循环背景下数字经济赋能实体经济高质量发展的微观机理与实证检验研究”(项目编号:21YJA7900280)
中央高校基本科研业务费项目“新时期党组织嵌入民营企业对企业成本决策的影响和机制分析”(项目编号:ZY2113)的资助
关键词
超额商誉
信息披露违规
经营风险
代理成本
融资约束
Excess Goodwill
Information Disclosure Violations
Business Risks
Agency Costs
Financing Constraints
