摘要
本文以2014—2019年全部A股上市公司为研究对象,不局限于管理层激励,将范围扩大至员工层面,探讨实施员工持股计划与企业投资效率的关系。研究结果表明:相对于未实施员工持股计划的公司,实施员工持股计划的公司进行非投资效率的可能性更低。这主要是由于员工持股计划缓解了企业投资不足现象。进一步研究发现,在非国有企业与高代理成本样本中,员工持股计划对于投资不足的作用才能得到充分发挥。内在机制研究发现,实施员工持股计划有利于推动企业内部控制质量的提高,且在投资不足样本中发挥中介效应。本文的研究揭示了实施员工持股计划对企业投资效率的影响以及内在机制,为推动上市公司实施员工持股计划以及促进企业投资效率提供了新的思考。
Taking all A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2019 as research obijects,not limited to management incentives,extending the scope to the employee level,this paper discusses the rela tionship between the implementation of employee stock ownership plan and investment efficiency.The results show that compared with companies that have not implemented employee stock ownership plans,companies that have implemented employee stock ownership plans are less likely to have non-investment efficiency.This is mainly because the employee stock ownership plan alleviates the phenomenon of insufficient investment in enterprises.Further study found that,in the sample of underinvestment of non-state owned enterprises and high agency cost,the effect of employee stock ownership plan on underinvestment has been significantly exerted.Research on internal mechanism found that the implementation of employee stock ownership plan is conducive to the improvement of internal control,and internal control plays an intermediary role in underinvestment samples.The research in this paper reveals the influence and internal mechanism of the implementation of employee stock ownership plan on the investment efficiency of enterprises,and provides new thinking for promoting the im plementation of employee stock ownership plan in listed companies and promoting the investment efficiency of enterprises.
作者
莫惠
欧阳越秀
Hui MO;Yuexiu OUYANG(School of Business,Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234,China)
出处
《金融管理研究》
2023年第1期1-24,共24页
The Journal of Finance and Management Research
关键词
员工持股计划
投资效率
代理成本
监督效应
内部控制质
employee stock ownership plan
efficiency of investment
agency cost
supervision effect
internal control quality
