摘要
环保垂直管理与属地管理孰优孰劣,能否兼顾二者的优势,涉及到各级地方政府及环保部门间的权力配置与权责划分。本文以省以下环保垂直管理改革作为外生冲击,分析了环保权限部分上收及执法重心下沉所发挥的治理效应。研究发现:改革显著促进了地方污染企业的绿色投资,并改善了地区环境质量。在机制检验中,省级环保部门监管能力与基层环保部门独立性的同步增强,提升了地区环保执法力度,进而实现了治理效应。在影响改革成效的约束性因素分析中,地方政府具备较强环境治理动机、面临较低的税收依赖,以及企业的国有属性、面临更小融资约束均会提升地方政府及污染企业对改革的配合意愿,从而增强改革效果。本文从微观企业投入视角验证了环保垂直管理改革的基层治理效应,回应了垂直管理和属地管理利弊的理论之争,为省以下各级地方政府及环保部门在基层环境治理中如何分工协作提供了经验证据。
Different environmental management systems will have different governance effects.Whether vertical environmental protection management is superior to territorial one is the main focus of theoretical debates and a difficult problem faced by decision-makers.China has long adopted a territory-based dual leadership model to manage local environmental affairs.This model has the obvious advantages of sufficient information,rapid response,and precise governance.Can the vertical environmental management reform below the provincial level,as an overall institutional arrangement to adjust the labor division and administrative authority among environmental protection departments and local governments,overcome inherent flaws of the environmental protection system and promote substantial improvements in regional environmental governance?What is the specific mechanism of such reform?These questions need to be answered.In September 2016,the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council jointly issued the Guidelines for the Pilot Program for the Vertical Management Reform of Environmental Monitoring,Inspection and Law Enforcement below the Provincial Level,officially launching the sub-provincial vertical environmental management reform.Unlike previous environmental governance practices based on territorial management,this reform involves institutional and holistic changes in the environmental governance authority and environmental administrative jurisdictional relationship at the grassroots level.Besides,it is a top-down reform implemented by the central government and gradually launched in various regions.The reform enhances the regulatory ability of provincial environmental protection departments and the independence of grassroots environmental protection departments.This provides an appropriate setting to investigate the grassroots governance effects of the vertical environmental management system and its mechanisms.Using the vertical management reform of environmental protection below the provincial level as an exogenous shock,this paper constructs a staggered difference-in-differences model to investigate the real effects of local environmental protection departments coming directly under the supervision of their respective provincial-level agencies and empowering the implementation authority to grassroots departments.We find that this reform significantly promotes the green investment of local polluting enterprises,and improves the regional environmental quality.The reform realizes such environmental governance effects by enhancing the regulatory ability of provincial environmental protection departments and the independence of grassroots environmental protection departments.The analysis of constraining factors of reform results shows that local governments’stronger environmental governance incentives and lower tax reliance strengthen governance effects of the reform.Moreover,enterprises that are state-owned or face fewer financing constraints are more willing to cooperate with local governments,which manifest itself in more effective environmental governance.This paper may have the following contributions.First,based on the practices of the sub-provincial vertical environmental management reform,by identifying the environmental governance effects and mechanisms of vertical management reform,this paper provides an alternative theoretical perspective and practical path for the debate on the pros and cons of vertical environmental protection management versus the territorial one,enriching the traditional environmental decentralization theory.Second,by analyzing the environmental governance logic between local governments as dominator of environment governance and polluting enterprises as environmental governance subject in the sub-provincial vertical environmental protection reform,this paper adds to the grassroots governance theory from the environmental perspective.Third,we effectively identify the governance effects of sub-provincial vertical management reform,reveal the“black box”of the mechanism,and clarify the conditions for the successful implementation of the reform.These results provide empirical evidence for assessing the central government’s practices in optimizing the environmental management system.
作者
张琦
邹梦琪
ZHANG Qi;ZOU Mengqi(Government Accounting Research Institute,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;School of Accounting,Zhejiang Gongshang University)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第8期172-190,共19页
Economic Research Journal
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(20JZD017)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71872182)的资助
关键词
环保垂直管理改革
企业绿色投资
环境治理
基层机制
Vertical Management Reform of Environmental Protection Departments
Enterprise Green Investment
Environmental Governance
Grassroots Mechanism
