摘要
本文以1998—2015年中国民营上市公司为样本,检验企业家控制权、创业资本与资本配置效率之间的关系,研究发现:第一,企业家控制权能够促进资本配置效率,验证并拓展了Coase(1937)所强调的企业家控制权在资源配置中的重要作用。第二,创业资本对企业家控制权-资本配置效率敏感性具有负面影响,验证了Kaplan&Stromberg(2003,2004)所提出的创业资本对企业家控制权的分割作用,为创业资本影响企业价值提供了企业家控制权视角的理论基础和实证证据。第三,企业家控制权的增值效应在治理、管理两种控制权上均有体现,但创业资本的分割效应更多地体现为对治理控制权的分割。第四,在将技术效率替换为单要素生产率、全要素生产率、全要素生产率增长及其分解指标后,以及通过工具变量法、倾向得分匹配和干预效应模型处理内生性问题后,原有结论依然成立。第五,企业家控制权的增值效应在中国传统文化背景下更为明显,而创业资本的分割效应则受到多个因素的制约,包括企业家层面的政治背景、公司层面的融资约束和增长机会、中观层面的行业和地区因素。
On the macro level,the relationship between financial development and economic growth has been a long-term concern of scholars.As a special financial capital,venture capital has gained widespread consensus on its influence on economic growth and corresponding mechanism,and has been studied from various aspects.In early theoretical work,venture capital was often mentioned in conjunction with entrepreneurs.Discussions focused on how to allocate control rights between venture capitalists with no ideas but money and entrepreneurs with no money but ideas.However,very little literature provides empirical evidence on it.This paper attempts to remedy two deficiencies in current literature.First,most research on control rights is based on principal-agent theory,neglecting the role of entrepreneurs,who are non-agents.Second,although the positive role of venture capital has been extensively discussed,little literature uses large samples to examine the impact of venture capital on entrepreneurs,especially on the control rights of entrepreneurs.In this circumstance,we empirically test the relationship between entrepreneurs’control rights and capital allocation efficiency by taking Chinese private listed companies from 1998 to 2005 as samples based on Coase’s(1937)spirit,who emphasized that entrepreneurs’control rights play an important role in resource allocation.Subsequently,we investigate the impact of venture capital on the relationship between them.The findings of this paper are as follows.Firstly,entrepreneurs’control rights can promote the efficiency of capital allocation,confirming and expanding Coase’s(1937)viewpoint that entrepreneurial authority plays an important role in resource allocation.Secondly,venture capital impairs the sensitivity between entrepreneurs’control rights and capital allocation efficiency,confirming the segmentation effect of venture capital on entrepreneurs’control rights inspired by Kaplan&Stromberg(2003,2004)and providing the theoretical basis and empirical evidence for the impact of venture capital on enterprise from the perspective of entrepreneurs’control right.Thirdly,the value-added effect of entrepreneurs’control rights exists in both governance and management structure,while the segmentation effect of venture capital mainly exists in the former case.Fourthly,the original conclusion still holds after replacing technical efficiency with single-factor productivity,total factor productivity,total factor productivity growth and its decomposition indexes,as well as treating endogenous problems through the instrumental variable method,propensity score matching method,and treatment effect model.Fifthly,the value-added effect of entrepreneurs’control rights is more obvious against the background of Chinese traditional culture.However,the segmentation effect of venture capital is moderated by many factors,including the political background at the entrepreneur level,financing constraints and growth opportunities at the firm level,and industrial and regional factors at the meso level.The contribution of our research can be summarized as follows.First of all,adhering to the spirit of Coase(1937),we reconstruct the concept of"entrepreneurs’control rights"based on the definition of the firm,the entrepreneur and the control rights,and propose a logically consistent measure by constructing"entrepreneurs’control rights index"accordingly.Secondly,based on Coase’s(1937)firm theory,which emphasizes transaction activities and transaction costs,we further expand the existing conditions of firms,and on this basis,expand and verify the effect of entrepreneurs’control rights on capital allocation efficiency,and make up for the neglect of the role of entrepreneurs in current empirical work on control rights.Thirdly,inspired by the empirical findings of Kaplan&Stromberg(2003,2004)and based on the value-added effect of entrepreneurs’control rights,we analyze the influence mechanism of venture capital through the channel of entrepreneurs’control rights,and put forward and test the"segmentation effect"of venture capital,which provides new approaches and new evidence on how venture capital may influence firm value.Fourthly,combined with China’s situation,we examine the restraining factors of the value-added effect of entrepreneurs’control rights and the segmentation effect of venture capital,including Chinese culture,the political background of entrepreneurs,financing constraints and growth opportunities of the firm,and also regional and industrial factors,which improves the understanding of the mechanism and relationship between entrepreneurs’control rights and venture capital.
作者
覃家琦
杨玉晨
王力军
杨雪
QIN Jiaqi;YANG Yuchen;WANG Lijun;YANG Xue(Nankai University;Beijing Technology and Business University)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第3期132-149,共18页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372096、71772091)资助
关键词
企业家控制权
创业资本
资本配置效率
Entrepreneurs’Control Rights
Venture Capital
Capital Allocation Efficiency
