摘要
本文通过建立中国商业银行同业业务的理论框架,分析了银行同业业务的内在脆弱性以及银行市场竞争势力对同业业务的影响机制。本文发现,市场竞争增加了银行间的套利空间,进而推动银行同业业务发展。但由于同业资金具有较短的期限结构,因而银行间的挤兑风险加剧了同业业务的内在脆弱性。随着同业负债比重的扩大,银行对政府隐性担保的依赖将进一步扭曲银行的风险承担机制。最后,本文通过实证研究验证了理论模型的相关推论:银行的市场竞争势力越低,银行对同业业务的依赖度越高,同时表内信贷业务的盈利能力表现出显著的正向中介效应。
This paper analyzes the inherent fragility of the interbank business and the influence mechanism of the bank’s market power on the interbank business by establishing a theoretical framework of the interbank business of China’s commercial banks.Results show that market competition has increased the arbitrage space between banks,which in turn promotes the development of interbank business.However,due to the short-term structure of interbank funds,the risk of interbank runs has exacerbated the inherent vulnerability of interbank business.With the expansion of the proportion of interbank liabilities,banks’reliance on implicit government guarantees will further distort banks’risk-taking mechanisms.Finally,we verify the implications of the theoretical model through empirical research:the lower the market power of the bank is,the higher the bank’s dependence on interbank business,and the profitability of on-balance sheet credit business shows a significantly positive intermediary effect.
作者
刘澜飚
李博韬
LIU Lanbiao;LI Botao(Nankai University,Tianjin,China)
出处
《经济学动态》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第4期38-53,共16页
Economic Perspectives
基金
国家社会科学基金重大专项“我国债务危机风险的防范治理与有效缓解对策研究”(18VFH007)
国家自然科学基金面上项目“外部冲击对中国金融稳定的影响机理:不确定性与公共事件冲击视角”(72073076)
国家自然科学基金面上项目“基于大数据的中国金融系统性风险测度及其演化规律研究”(71873070)
