摘要
使用沪深两市2010~2018年A股上市公司为样本,引入并购商誉这一中介变量,实证检验管理者过度自信对股价崩盘风险的作用机制,研究发现,管理者过度自信会提高商誉,从而加大股价崩盘风险,商誉在管理者过度自信对股价崩盘风险的作用中发挥了中介效应;这一作用机制在国有企业与非国有企业之间存在显著差异,相对于国有企业,非国有企业的作用机制更为显著。研究结果有利于厘清管理者过度自信对股价崩盘风险的作用机制,为企业与投资者提供了监督管理依据和信号。因此,应针对管理者的特征进行针对化、差异化的监督,以降低管理者过度自信导致的股价崩盘风险。
Using Chinese A-share-listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2018,this study empirically tested the mechanism for the effect of managerial overconfidence on the stock price crash risk by incorporating goodwill in mergers and acquisitions as a mediator.The results showed that managerial overconfidence increased goodwill,thereby aggravating the stock price crash risk,while goodwill mediated the effect of managerial overconfidence on stock price crash risk.This mechanism was significantly different between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises,where it was more significant in non-state-owned enterprises.The results of this study helped clarify the mechanism for the effect of managerial overconfidence on the stock price crash risk,thereby providing a basis and signal for supervising and managing enterprises and investors.Therefore,corporate regulators and investors should pay attention to stock price crash risk caused by managerial overconfidence.
作者
吴定玉
詹霓
Wu Dingyu;Zhan Ni(Business School,Hunan Normal University,Hunan,Changsha 410081,China)
出处
《金融经济学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期108-120,160,共14页
Financial Economics Research
基金
湖南省社会科学基金(17YBA281)
关键词
管理者过度自信
股价崩盘风险
并购商誉
managerial overconfidence
stock price crash risk
goodwill in mergers and acquisitions
