摘要
信用惩戒在疫情防控中的广泛适用需要解决违法行为可否以及如何实施信用惩戒的问题。相较于违法行为也是违约行为说,从违法行为的信用风险维度出发理解违法行为的信用惩戒更具合理性。其内在逻辑在于,失信的本质不在于违约,而在于失去资源配置主体的信任。违法行为正因有助于资源配置主体预判进而规避资源配置风险而具有信用信息维度。行政机关作为执法资源配置机关、公共资源配置机关,可以利用违法信息作为信用信息来规避执法资源配置风险、公共资源配置风险。据此逻辑,行政机关可以根据违法行为信息实施信用惩戒,但这种惩戒本质上是规避资源配置风险之举措,而非违法行为的惩戒手段。与之相应,信用惩戒必须建立在科学的算法之上,针对不同的资源配置领域与不同程度的风险而分领域、分层级实施。
The wide application of credit punishment in prevention and control of COVID-19 needs to solve the problem of whether and how to implement credit punishment.Compared with the opinion that illegal behavior is also an action of breach of contract,it is more reasonable to understand the credit punishment of illegal behavior from the credit risk dimension of illegal behavior.Its internal logic is that the essence of dishonesty is not to break the contract,but to lose the trust of the resource allocation subject.The illegal behavior has the dimension of credit information because it helps the resource allocation subject to predict and avoid the risk of resource allocation.Administrative organs who enforce law and allocate public resource can use the information of illegal behavior as credit information to avoid the risk of law enforcement and public resource allocation.According to this logic,the administrative organ can implement credit punishment according to the information of illegal behavior,but this kind of punishment is essentially a measure of risk aversion of resource allocation,rather than a punishment for illegal behavior.Accordingly,credit punishment must be based on scientific algorithm,and implemented in different fields and levels according to different resource allocation fields and different degrees of risk.So is the credit punishment in prevention and control of COVID-19.
出处
《法学评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期40-50,共11页
Law Review
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费重点项目“社会信用惩戒的法治化建构研究”(项目编号:DUT20RW201)的阶段性成果
关键词
违法行为
信用惩戒
违法行为信息
资源配置
风险规避
Illegal Behavior
Credit Punishment
Information of Illegal Behavior
Resource Allocation
Risk Aversion
