摘要
随着P2P网贷市场迅猛发展,风险问题也愈加凸显;为了推动P2P网贷市场的持续健康发展,需要在明晰P2P网贷风险演化机理的基础上,对其进行有效监管.本文在此背景下,应用演化博弈理论,建立P2P网贷平台和监管方博弈模型,对模型进行求解和推演,并在此基础上进行数值实验,以揭示P2P网贷风险演化规律.研究结果表明:在既定的条件下,P2P网贷风险是平台方和监管方重复博弈的结果,市场风险水平随双方行为群体结构的变化而变化;P2P平台合规经营收益提高会引起平台群体风险水平下降;监管方严格监管收益增加,宽松监管收益降低,会导致监管方群体风险水平下降;平台惩罚力度和监管方转移收入增加将使P2P平台群体和监管方群体风险水平同时下降,逐渐形成相对较低的P2P网贷市场风险水平.
Risk issues of peer-to-peer(P2P)lending have become increasingly prominent with its rapid development;in order to promote the sustained and healthy development of the P2P lending market,it is necessary to effectively supervise the P2P lending risk evolution mechanism based on its clarity.This paper applies evolutionary game theory by establishing a game model between P2P platform and supervisor in this context.The model is then solved and deduced,and numerical experiments are carried out on this basis to reveal the rules of P2P lending risk evolution.We find that the P2P lending risk is the result of repeated game between the platform and the supervisory under the established conditions,the level of market risk varies with the structure of the behavioral groups of both parties.The increase in the compliant operating income of the P2P platform will decrease the risk level of the platform group;the raise in the strict supervision income and the reduction in the loose regulatory income will lead to a decrease in the risk level of the regulators;the risk level of both parties will decline when the penalty of the platform and the transfer income of the regulator increase,and the relatively low online P2P lending risk level is gradually formed.
作者
魏明侠
赵艳
夏雨
Wei Mingxia;Zhao Yan;Xia Yu(School of Management,Henan University of Technology,Zhengzhou 450001;School of Information Management,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079)
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第3期54-65,共12页
Management Review
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(18BGL264)
河南省高校哲学社会科学创新团队项目(2019CXTD-04)
河南省高校人文社科重点研究基地资助项目(2015-JD-04)
关键词
P2P网贷风险
P2P平台
监管方
演化博弈
online peer-to-peer lending risk
P2P platform
supervisor
evolutionary game
