摘要
虚拟企业作为一种新兴的企业管理模式,因其能在短时间内集合各种企业外部资源来追逐一个稍纵即逝的市场机会等优点,受到越来越多的管理者的重视.然而,虚拟企业各成员间合作都是利益驱动的,因此如何防止虚拟企业成员的机会主义行为损坏虚拟企业的利益,协调好各成员之间的关系是虚拟企业成功运行需要解决的首要问题.期望联合监控机制和收益共享合同来激励各伙伴企业付出更多努力,从而增加虚拟企业收益并减少搭便车行为.并通过建立模型比较4种不同监控机制对于伙伴企业个体行为及虚拟企业整体利益的影响.
As a new kind of enterprise management model,virtual enterprises(VEs) are getting to be a practical choice of more and more enterprises since it could catch the transient market opportunities by integrating the outside resources in a short time.However,virtual enterprises are profit-driven,thereby the first thing that VE should solve is how to prevent the VE profit from being harmed by free-riding behavior and how to coordinate the relationship between members.In order to increase the VE output,monitoring m...
出处
《复旦学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第4期489-496,共8页
Journal of Fudan University：Natural Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70321001
70231010)
关键词
虚拟企业
收益共享
监控机制
激励
关系风险
virtual enterprise
revenue sharing
monitoring mechanism
incentive
relational risk
