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两类拍卖的收益等价性和均衡投标价格排序 被引量：2

Revenue Equivalence and Equilibrium Bidding Rank of Two Kinds of Auctions
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摘要 以收益等价原理为基础,在独立私人估价模型假设下将四类基本拍卖形式与两类全支付拍卖形式进行对比研究.依据买者的均衡期望收益、卖者的均衡期望收益和均衡期望报价这三个指标,给出了排序关系.得出了报价虽然不同,但不同拍卖形式中买卖双方期望收益等价的结论.并将收益等价原理用于均衡策略的求解.
作者 乔恒 邱菀华
机构地区 北京航空航天大学经济管理学院
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 2005年第z1期224-227,共4页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项基金资助项目(200159) 航空科学预研基金资助项目(03J51057) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372011)
关键词 第一价格全支付拍卖 第二价格全支付拍卖 消耗战 第一价格胜者支付拍卖 第二价格胜者支付拍卖 收益等价定理
分类号 F224 [经济管理—国民经济]
  • 相关文献

参考文献9

  • 1王彦,李楚霖.拍卖机制理论中的收益等价性及应用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004,24(4):88-91. 被引量：8
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二级参考文献11

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共引文献7

同被引文献31

  • 1李长杰,王先甲,范文涛.水权交易机制及博弈模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(5):90-94. 被引量：22
  • 2Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 1961,16 (1): 8-37.
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  • 4Riley J, Samuelson W. Optimal auction. American Economic Review, 1981, 71(3): 381-392.
  • 5Milgrom P, Weber R. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 1982, 50(4): 1089-1122.
  • 6Fang H,Parreiras S. Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case.Games and Economic Behavior, 2002,39(2): 215-236.
  • 7Kotowski M,Li F. On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value,all-pay auctions with private budget constraints. Games andEconomic Behavior, 2014,85(1): 84-108.
  • 8Siegel R. Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations. Journal of Economic Theory, 2014,153(1): 684-702.
  • 9Maynard S. The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1974,47(1): 209-221.
  • 10Giith W, Damme E. A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games. Social Choice and Welfare, 1986,3(3):177-198.

引证文献2

二级引证文献6

中国管理科学
2005年 第z1期

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