声誉机制对我国社会保障基金投资管理人的激励效应被引量：5

Research on the Incentive Effect of Prestige Mechanism on Investment Supervisors in NSIFC

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摘要全国社会保障基金理事会的投资管理地位已经确立,那么它就与其投资管理人形成了委托-代理关系。根据博弈论可知,若企业家只是重视短期利益,不注重其自身的声誉,在短期内可能获得最大化利润,而从中长期看来却不能。若建立有效的投资管理人声誉机制,则可以解决投资管理人个人收益函数与全国社保基金会的利益函数不一致性的问题。在Meyer和Vickers所建立的声誉机制模型的基础上,把声誉机制引入我国的社会保障基金的个人账户投资领域,进一步研究其对我国个人账户基金投资管理人的激励和约束作用,建立了基金投资管理人声誉机制模型,说明了声誉机制对全国社会保障基金理事会在激励投资管理人方面发挥的重要作用,并为更好地发挥该机制作用提出了几点建议。 The establishment of the National Social Insurance Fund Council (NSIFC) indicates the formation of the principal-agent relationship between the NSIFC and investment supervisors. According to game theory, it is known that if entrepreneurs only take the short-term benefits into considerations, they will not pay much attention to its own prestige. If an effective prestige mechanism for investment supervisors can be established, it is possible to reduce the differentials between the individual revenue function ...

作者邓大松王增文

机构地区武汉大学社会保障研究中心

出处《公共管理学报》 CSSCI 2008年第3期109-113,127,共6页 Journal of Public Management

基金教育部理论研究课题(2008JYJW033)

关键词声誉机制全国社会保障基金理事会投资管理人激励机制 Prestige Mechanism Nation Social Insurance Fund Council Investment Supervisor Incentive Mechanism

分类号 F842 [经济管理—保险]

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