摘要
近年来,地方政府都不同程度地存在着信用问题,它极大地影响了政府的形象和威信,影响了社会整体信用水平的提高,影响了社会交易与资源配置的效率。文章从经济人假设出发,利用博弈理论和成本收益分析,从剖析政府官员微观个体行为的角度,分析政府信用缺失问题。试图证明唯有从制度变革人手,才能从根本上解决政府信用缺失问题,并提出了制度建设的方向。
The non - credibility or deceit of local government destroies government' s authority, impede the improvement of the level of social credibility and cut down the efficiency of transaction and the arrangement of the natural resources. In the article, the non - credibility of the government is analyzed by game theory, and cost - revenue analysis is used to explain the action of government employees. It is expected to prove that institution - making is the only way to solve the problem of the non - credibility of the government, and this article also suggests the direction of institution - making.
出处
《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2003年第z1期12-17,共6页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
政府信用
博弈
成本-收益比较
the credibility of the government
game theory
cost - revenue comparison
