摘要
文章先对安然公司及其造假事件的前前后后作了描述,接着进行经营者股权激励约束机制可能失效的原因分析——在企业经营效益预期不好和公司结构复杂、监督难度加大情况下,经营者通过寻租行为来瓦解董事会、监事会对其监督以实现自身利益最大化。然后运用预期效用理论来论证原因的成立。最后,从预期效用理论分析中找出防止经营者股权激励约束机制失效的对应措施。
The paper describes Enron company and its scandles on accounting, analyzes the possible reasons of the failure of stock equity supervision, and company' s structure is complex which results in the difficulty of supervision, the operators incline evading the supervision of the directorate hence they can maximize their own utilities via rent seeking. The prospective utility theory is used to demonstrate the canse in the failure. In the end of the paper, the responsive measuves is found in prospective utility theory to prevent the failure of the supervision.
出处
《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2003年第z1期102-106,共5页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
股权
激励
寻租
预期
stock equity
supervision
rent seeking
prospective utility
