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二级参考文献2
1Yoram C. Peles,Greg Whittred. Incentive effects of rate-of-return regulation: The case of Hong Kong electric utilities[J] 1996,Journal of Regulatory Economics(1):99～112
2Jasmin Ansar. Multifactor productivity growth: Empirical results for a major United States utility[J] 1990,Journal of Regulatory Economics(3):251～262
