摘要
为探究政府管制在企业实施逆向物流中的作用,在分析政府和企业在不同策略下各自的成本和收益的基础上,运用演化博弈理论构建一个政府与企业的演化博弈模型,模型分析结果显示:企业实施逆向物流的成本与收益、政府监管的有效性以及对企业不实施逆向物流的惩罚力度都直接影响系统演化的结果;政府群体和企业群体在3种情况下存在演化稳定策略;在一定条件下,系统的演化呈现出周期性的特征.政府加大惩罚力度、提高监管效率,企业树立逆向物流的思想、加强企业间的合作与交流,是双方实现长期共赢的唯一途径.
In order to investigate the supervision of governments in the implementation of reverse logistics,this paper analyses their respective costs and benefits,and establishes an evolutionary game model between governments and enterprises based on evolutionary game theory.Game analysis shows: enterprises costs and benefits to implement reverse logistics,regulatory efficiency and punishments from governments directly affect the game results;there are three evolutionary stable strategies in three cases.Under certa...
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第4期520-525,共6页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
上海市重点学科建设资助项目(S30504)
关键词
逆向物流
演化稳定策略
复制动态
reverse logistics
evolutionary stable strategy
replicator dynamics
