摘要
基于我国上市公司实行多元化经营战略的背景,从公司过度投资的视角对财务杠杆的治理效应进行了理论分析,并以2004-2009年的非金融上市公司为样本,检验了多元化经营对财务杠杆抑制企业过度投资治理效应的影响。结果发现,财务杠杆对我国上市公司的过度投资行为有明显的抑制作用,但是多元化经营会削弱这种抑制作用。进一步研究还发现,财务杠杆由于抑制过度投资,对公司绩效起到了正面的影响。而多元化经营同样会弱化财务杠杆对公司绩效的正面作用。研究结论不仅对于理解我国多元化经营的上市公司财务杠杆治理效应与投资效率之间的关系具有重要意义,同时也为我国上市公司多元化经营会降低公司经营业绩提供了新的证据。
Based on the background of diversification in Chinese listed companies,this paper gives a theoretical analysis about the governance effect of leverage from the perspective of over-investment,In addition,by using the data from 2004 to 2009 of Chinese listed companies as a sample,we test the effects of diversification on governance effect of leverage about attenuating over-investment.The results show that leverage has a significant negative effect on firm's over-investment,but diversification will weaken this effect;we also find that,leverage can improve company performance by attenuating over-investment,but diversification weaken the positive effect of leverage.This study will not only have great significance of understanding the relationship between the governance effect of leverage and the effect of investment,but also provide evidence to explain why performance of diversified companies tends to reduce.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期83-91,共9页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70962005)
国家社科基金项目(11XGL002)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-08-0919)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJA630103,10YJA630015)
新疆维吾尔自治区普通高校人文社科重点研究基地项目(XJEDU020112A01)
关键词
财务杠杆
多元化经营
过度投资
公司绩效
投资效率
资本市场
资本结构
leverage
diversification
over-investment
corporate performance
investment efficiency
capital market
capital structure