摘要
中国的股权分置改革一方面要使非流通股股东取得流通权,另一方面也要让流通股股东获得合理补偿以求改革能够稳定推进。传统观点下的契约理论和行政征收理论均不能适切解释中国的股权分置改革方案。在公、私法融合背景下,美国学者新近提出的行政授予(regulatory givings)学说,可与大陆法上的行政行为附款理论相互协力,为股权分置改革方案提供正当性基础。应须指出,中国的改革方案通过非流通股股东和流通股股东协商的方式进行估价和实现补偿,采用财产法则而非补偿法则保障流通股股东的权益,实属符合经济效率之举。然而,本方案仍有诸多值得改进之处。
This article conducts a legal and economic analysis of the Chinese split share structure reform. Under the legal analysis, the authors argue that traditional approaches in private and public law fail to provide a valid legal or doctrinal basis for requiring non-tradable shareholders to compensate tradable shareholders for the right to trade. Even the more developed US regulatory takings jurisprudence would not provide the tradable shareholders with a right to compensation for the loss they suffered from the trading of non-tradable shares. This is where the authors turn to the new givings jurisprudence recently developed in the U. S. and apply the jurisprudence to the Chinese case - givings subject to a condition precedent. The authors then utilize economic analysis to evaluate the Chinese implemented reform and to propose some recommendations. In conclusion, the Chinese reform, has been a fruitful application of the givings jurisprudence. In particular, the innovation of u-sing privatized bargaining mechanism and the hybrid public-private nature of the whole process provide useful guidance on future government policies and regulations.
出处
《北大法律评论》
2007年第1期78-105,共28页
Peking University Law Review
关键词
股权分置改革
流通权
行政授予
补偿协商
财产法则
bargaining for compensation non-tradable shares property rule public-private law dichotomy regulatory giving split share structure stock trading rights reform
