摘要
100多年前,中国人初次进行公司制实验的时候,人们的美好期望是:公司成员之间利害相共,人无异心,上下相准,举无败事,从而振工商之业,富强中国。当时的中国政府也以"官督商办"和"官商合办"等政策表达了他们对公司制度的理解。但实际上,官督并未防其弊,清末的股份公司充斥着股东之间的倾轧以及官股和商股之间的明争暗斗,公司管理人员不但没有"秉公而司其事",反而大肆挪用公司资金,以权谋私。泛滥成灾的大股东。
Conflict of interest in Chinese listed corporations is a serious problem.The article focuses on the following issues:What kind of conflicts of interest usually occur in listed corporations?Why can't existing laws and legal institutions prevent conflicts of interest?The article argues that the above conflicts of interest are determined or supported by a set of de facto institutions that actually undermine Company Law and Securities Law.These de facto institutions are derived from and justified by the state's existing legislative policies. it is necessary to reconsider these policies.Finally,the article suggests some goals of legal and institutional reforms.
出处
《北大法律评论》
2001年第1期82-117,共36页
Peking University Law Review
