摘要
本文构造了一个可解释某些市场上真品与假冒伪劣产品共存现象的不完全信息动态博弈的信号传递模型。根据该模型，具有品牌价值的产品和垄断力量较强的产品易被假冒。模型还指出，政府增大对制假者的打击力度或加大查处制假者的努力，都会有助于迫使制假者退出市场。
A signalling game theory model of market with conterfeit products is constructed in this paper According to the model, products produced by enterprises which have stronger market power are liable to be conterfeited From the model, some meaningful inferences suggest that the government should strengthen the punishment on or/& inspecting of counterfeit products makers, which is conductive to force counterfeit products makers withdraw from the market
出处
《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》
1999年第3期53-56,共4页
Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家杰出青年科学基金
关键词
博奕论
信号传递博奕模型
不完全信息动态博弈
产业组织
game theory signalling game model dynamic game of incomplete information industry organization
