摘要
从工程业主与承包商间的委托代理关系出发 ,分析了这种委托代理关系下的信息不对称本质 ,及其引发的承包商道德风险与逆选择是造成工程承包合同失灵的根源 .文章提出并论证了工程担保机制是矫正这种合同失灵的根本手段 。
The paper that the nature of asymmetry distribution of information between the princapal and agent of project is analysed in which moral hazards induced and the adverse selection of agent is a origin of executive failure of the contract of project. The nature, function, executive policies, and its matching measures & condition of surety mechanism of project which overcomes the failure are also analysed.
出处
《西安交通大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2001年第S1期46-50,共5页
Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University
关键词
工程担保机制
惩戒机制
理论分析
surety mechanism of project
punishment mechanism
theoretic approach
