摘要
文章讨论了当存在碳税和管理激励的条件下,企业拥有低碳技术时技术转让方式的最优选择问题。运用基于博弈论的数量竞争模型和讨价还价模型,假定双寡头市场中某企业拥有低碳技术,具体研究了存在管理激励条件下的固定费用和比例抽成两种技术许可方式。结果表明:显著创新情形下,创新企业不会将技术许可给其他企业使用。非显著创新情形下,当创新在特定幅度以内时,创新企业愿意进行技术许可;但当创新超过特定幅度时,只有在比例抽成方式下,企业才愿意进行技术许可。对创新企业而言,比例抽成的技术许可方式优于固定费用许可方式,管理激励的存在与否会影响创新企业在进行比例抽成许可方式时的最大抽成比例,而不同的技术许可方式也会对企业内部的均衡管理激励程度产生影响。
With the carbon tax and managerial incentive being imposed , the optimal selection problem of transfer of low carbon technology is discussed .It assumes that , in a duopoly market under managerial in-centive with regard to the carbon tax , one of the firms has a low-carbon technology .Based on Cournot competition model and bargaining model , fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing are studied by using game theory .It shows that , if the innovation is drastic , the firm does not want to license its low carbon technology .If the innovation is non-drastic , whether the firm is willing to license its technology or not de-pends on how drastic the innovation is .Royalty licensing is always better than fixed-fee licensing for the innovative firm.There is a managerial incentive that affects the amount of the royalty .Further, different technology licensing influences the firm's equilibrium managerial incentive .
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2014年第1期120-125,共6页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071075
71173103)
国家社科基金重大项目(12&ZD204)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJA790183
12YJC630180)
关键词
碳税
博弈分析
管理激励
carbon tax
game theoretical analysis
managerial incentive
