摘要
农地转用决策理论能为农地保护制度建设提供重要的参考依据,但经典的决策模型并不适用于我国地方政府主导农地转用的现状。本文基于地方政府行为理论,构建了适用于国内背景的农地转用决策模型,以分析地方政府农地转用决策的特征。结果表明,建设用地对经济产出的边际贡献、土地出让金水平是地方政府农地转用决策的重要依据,地区经济质量和农地资源禀赋对地方政府决策弹性分别起到负向和正向的影响,由于地方政府在决策时可能存在的偏好和非理性因素,农地转用的最优规模无法仅仅依赖于外部性内化政策实现。
Rural-urban land conversion decision-making is a fundamental issue in land economics.However,the literature considering decision-makers as private agents does not hold within a Chinese context. In China,the role of local governments is important but the land market has less influence in land conversion processes. Here I attempt to es Tablelish an improved decision-making model of rural-urban land conversion. In the model,the maximize benefit of rural-urban land conversion is summed up based on the behavior objective of local officials,including economic development,financial revenue and corruption income. The decision model is built based on Lichtenberg's theoretical deduction,and preferences of decision-making elasticity are considered.Incentive variables are constructed by marginal GDP,financial revenue and private revenue of urban land,economical level and agricultural land endowment is chosen as preference characteristic variables. I found that urban land's marginal contribution to GDP and finance revenue significantly influence land conversion decision-making,but the corruption index does not.Significant interdependent variables confirm the hypothesis that economic level has a negative effect on decision elasticity of land finance revenue,meanwhile agricultural endowment has a positive effect on decision elasticity of GDP. GDP as an explanatory variable is more significant than marginal GDP from urban land use. In the decision-making process,local governments have preferences according to their characteristics,so taxation and fee policies from local to central government should have greater effects in less developed provinces,and land supervision should focus on provinces having abundant agricultural land. Local governments should consider the costs of agricultural land in the process of pursuing GDP. The central government should not determine the optimal amount of rural-urban land conversion by externalities internalization policies if local governments engage in irrational decision-making. Supervision of land use efficiency is a necessary measure to solve this problem.
出处
《资源科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第4期663-670,共8页
Resources Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71373095
71303260
41201581)
教育部人文社科基金项目(13YJC630016)
天津市高等学校人文社会科学研究项目(20142103)
关键词
农地转用决策
地方政府
决策偏好
决策优化
中国
decision-making of rural-urban land conversion
local government
decision preference
decision optimization
China
