摘要
当代西方国家行政改革基于公共选择理论和新保守主义,通过政府部门职能转换,向公共产品和服务领域导入市场竞争机制,以提高效率、优化社会资源配置。在考察西方国家以及日本行政体制改革主要特征的基础上,结合委托代理理论,对日本国立大学独立行政法人化改革展开分析得知,改革使政府与大学、大学与教师之间形成两组委托代理契约,政府对大学的评价机制和大学新的人事制度实质上是解决代理问题的监督机制;研究经费重点配置和技术转移收入的回馈则是激励机制。然而研究显示,信息不对称状态下,现有的监督和激励机制不足以完全解决新的委托代理契约中隐含的代理问题。
Contemporary western administrative reforms are based on the public choice theory and neo-conservatism, with the common objectives being to improve efficiency and to optimize the distribution of social resources by changing the roles of governments and by introducing the market competition mechanism into the fields of public goods and services. In light of the principal-agency theory, the paper observes the major characteristics of the administrative reforms in western countries including Japan and makes an analysis of the independent administrative corporation trend of Japanese state universities. It is found that the reform has established two principal-agency subcontracts between government and universities and between university and faculty, with the priority assignment of funds and the rewards from technical transfer being the chief incentives. The study also shows, however, that under the state of informational asymmetry, the projected monitoring and incentive mechani
出处
《现代日本经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第4期59-64,共6页
Contemporary Economy OF Japan
关键词
公共选择
代理
行政改革
独立行政法人
日本国立大学
public choice
administrative reform
agency issues
independent administrative corporation
