摘要
在引入佣金提成的独立私人价值模型及关联价值模型中,讨论第一价格和第二价格拍卖,发现佣金比例k的大小对投标人的出价策略、卖方和拍卖行的期望收益都有影响.k越大,买方出价越谨慎,卖方的期望收益更少,拍卖行的期望收益却更大.虽然买方会随着k的增大出价更谨慎,但均衡期望收益却与k无关.在独立私人价值模型中,当引入佣金时,收益等价性仍然成立.这对拍卖实践提供了建议:投标人(买方)对于佣金比例高低的担忧是多余的.
In the symmetry independent private value and affiliated value model which induced commission, this paper considers the bidding strategy in the first-price and second-price auctions. We find that the commission rate has effects on the bidders' biding strategy, on the expected profits of the seller and the auctioneer. The bigger the commission rate is, the more passively the bidder bids, and the fewer expected profit the seller makes, but the more expected profit the auctioneer has. To our surprised, the bidder's expected profit is not dependent on the commission rate. In the SIPV model, the revenue-equivalence theorem is also correct. These conclusions give some advices: the buyer need not worry about the high commission rate.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
2004年第4期45-48,94,共5页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70071012).
关键词
拍卖
佣金比例
均衡期望收益
auction
commission rate
equilibrium expected revenue
