摘要
将腐败看作官员的理性选择行为结果 ,建立了官员和政府之间的腐败与反腐败博弈模型。模型表明 :反腐应以中层官员为重点 ;高薪养廉并非好政策 ;
Considering corruption as a result from officials' rational choice behaviors, this paper establishes a game model to describe the relation between officials' corruption and government's anticorruption. The model suggests that in anticorruption emphasis should be put mainly on middle level officials; and high salary for anti-corruption is not a good policy; and the anti-corruption policies should focus on increase the costs of corruption behavior and reduce the cost coefficient of anti-corruption.
出处
《重庆工学院学报》
2004年第5期53-55,共3页
Journal of Chongqing Institute of Technology
基金
重庆工学院青年基金项目 ( 2 0 0 3ZQ13 )
