股权结构与公司业绩关系的行业特征——来自冶金、医药、机械与IT行业的实证证据被引量：16

The Industry Particulars of Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance-Empirical Findings from Metallurgical, Machinery, Pharmaceutical and IT Industry

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摘要冶金与医药行业第一大股东提高了业绩,冶金行业业绩明显靠固定资产投资拉动。医药第二大至第三大持股与公司业绩显著负相关,但第二大至第三大股东抑制了第一大股东占用上市公司资金。机械行业业绩,第一大持股与其负相关,第二至第十大与其正相关。前十大股东中具有信托投资公司的上市公司,关联资金占用显著高。IT行业,业绩与生产性股东个数显著正相关,与固定资产投资负相关。业绩与股份法人类别的相关性符号是:国家股与境内发起法人股之和,冶金与医药,显著为正,机械行业为负;募集法人股,机械行业显著为正,冶金为负;流通股,冶金与医药为负,但IT为正。 In metallurgical and pharmaceutical industries, the accounting performance is positively correlated with the largest shareholding; The second and third largest shareholding is significantly negatively correlated with the performance for pharmaceutical companies, but it is also significantly negatively correlated with the receivable from the largest stockholder. However, in machinery industry more shares owned by the second largest to ten largest stockholders, the corporations perform better.In metallurgical and pharmaceutical industries, corporation performance is positively correlated with the privately placement shares proportion of corporation founders. Public shares subscription from legal entities are negatively correlated with the corporation performance in metallurgy, though insignificant. But the mechanics industry is the opposite, it is positively correlated with the corporation performance.In both metallurgical and pharmaceutical industries, corporation performance is negatively correlated with the negotiated shares proportion, But the IT industry is on the opposite.In IT industry, corporation performance is positively correlated with the production stockholders among the top ten stockholders. In mechanics industry, the entrust company dummy is positively correlated with the receivables from the stockholders and their subsidiaries.

作者刘任帆于增彪

机构地区清华大学经济管理学院

出处《南开管理评论》 CSSCI 2004年第6期39-46,共8页 Nankai Business Review

关键词公司业绩机械行业大股东持股法人股 IT行业上市公司医药募集实证 The Stockholder Controlling Advantage The Receivables from the Stockholders and Their Subsidiaries Fixed Asset(S) Investment

分类号 F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

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