摘要
运用博弈论中重复博弈的原理,建立了电力市场两发电集团竞价上网有限次重复博弈模型,并对模型的纳 什均衡解进行分析。认为当2uM>uH>uM+uL且uM≥2uL时,触发策略会使发电侧合谋的发生,这种合谋对电力市 场的稳定是不利的。电力市场管理部门通过对报价上下限的控制,可以有效防止竞价者合谋的发生。
The bidding model of power generation group is established by using the principle of repeated games in games theory. It is proved by analyzing the Nash equilibrium of this model that generating side can cooperate by trigger strategy when 2uM>uH>uM+uL and uM≥2uL. The power marketing administration can control lower and upper limits through quoted prices, in order to effectively prevent the cooperation of the bidders that is unfavorable for the stabilization of power market.
出处
《西北水电》
2004年第4期66-68,共3页
Northwest Hydropower
关键词
电力市场
重复博弈
触发策略
合谋
防止
electric power market
repeated games
trigger strategy
cooperation
prevention
