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非对称信息下私人信息的揭示博弈分析 被引量:2

Revelation Game of the Private Information Under Asymmetric Information
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摘要 由于私人信息的存在,知情交易者利用信息优势将获取超额收益,而且可以决定是否在下一期才利用私人信息以期获取更高的超额收益,但也面临着丧失信息优势的可能性。在策略性市场博弈的框架内,得到了不同的交易策略下知情交易者利用私人信息所必须满足的条件及利用的最佳时机。 Because of the existence of the private information, the informed trader can make excess payoffs by using the information advantages. And also the informed trader can choose the trade strategies to attain the up most excess payoffs. However, he may lose his information advantages. This paper analyzes the conditions when the informed trader can make use of the private information and its optimal times underlying the framework of the strategic market game.
出处 《重庆大学学报(自然科学版)》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2004年第12期149-151,共3页 Journal of Chongqing University
关键词 非对称信息 私人信息 信息揭示 策略性市场博弈 asymmetric information private information information revelation strategic market game
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参考文献7

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