摘要
政府规制合同实际上是一个多重委托代理合同,这种多重性表现在两个方面,从纵向看,存在着公众、议会、规制机构、被规制企业之间的多重委托代理链条;从横向看,存在着两个或两个以上的规制机构共享对某一企业或行业的规制权的情形。在这两种情形中,由于信息不对称,都存在着代理人的道德风险,因而在制定规制政策时必须考虑这一问题。
Regulatory contracts can be considered as an agreement between principal and agent. Such multiple characters can be viewed from two aspects. From vertical, there is a multiple chain of principal-agent between the public, the Parliament, the regulators, and the regulated firms. Looking horizontally, there is a situation in which two or more regulators share the regulatory power to one firm or industry. There is inevitable moral hazard of agents in these two kinds of situation because of asymmetric information. Therefore, we should carefully study this issue in making regulatory policies.
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第12期35-39,86,共6页
Finance & Trade Economics
关键词
政府规制
多重委托代理
道德风险
信息
激励
Regulation, Multiple Principal-agent, Moral Hazard, Information, Incentives
